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This monograph forms part of a series of disease monographs commissioned by the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) over the period Nov 2015 to April 
2016 to inform funding priorities for the Livestock Vaccine Innovation Fund (LVIF). The 
LVIF is a seven-and-a-half year, CA$57 million partnership between the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation, Global Affairs Canada and Canada’s International Development 
Research Centre. It focuses on those animal diseases posing the greatest risk to poor 
livestock keepers in Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, targeting 
transboundary diseases to achieve lasting regional impact. 
 
The content presented here is as submitted by the consultant(s) involved and has been 
edited for appearance only. The views, information, or opinions expressed in this 
monograph are solely those of the individual consultant(s) involved and do not 
necessarily represent those of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Global Affairs Canada 
and International Development Research Centre, or any of their employees. Sections of 
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AICT  Anthrax immunochromatographic test 
AU  African Union 
AU-IBAR African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources 
AU-PANVAC African Union – Pan African Vaccine Centre  
CVO  Chief Veterinary Officer 
DG  Director General 
DoI  Duration of immunity 
DVS  Director Veterinary Services 
ELISA  Enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay 
FAO   Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
IM  Intramuscular 
IN  Intranasal 
LF  Lethal Factor 
mPA  mutant form of Protective Antigen (PA) 
NGO  Non-governmental organization 
OF  Oedema Factor (also known as Edema Factor) 
OIE  World Animal Health Organization 
PA  Protective Antigen 
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PCR  Polymerase chain reaction 
SC  Subcutaneous 
SHF  Small holder farmer 
TPP  Target Product Profile 
UEMOA West African Economic and Monetary Union (Union Économique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine) 
WHO  World Health Organization of the United Nations 
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Disease, etiology, epidemiology and impact 
Anthrax is a peracute, acute or subacute, highly contagious disease of domestic and wild animals and humans, 
caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis. Between outbreaks, the anthrax bacterium survives in the 
environment as a highly resistant spore.  The disease most commonly occurs in herbivores, which are infected 
after ingesting spores. It causes serious damage to domesticated animals and economic losses.  It is also 
important in wildlife, as it is part of the ecosystem in many natural parks, and poses a threat for endangered 
species, humans and neighboring livestock. In humans, the disease is acquired from contact with infected 
animals or animal products.  
Anthrax toxin and the capsule are the 2 major virulence factors.  The capsule is anti-phagocitary, and the toxin is 
composed by 3 nontoxic proteins, Lethal Factor (LF), Edema Factor (EF) and Protective Antigen (PA).  The PA is 
the principal antigen responsible for the production of toxin-neutralizing antibodies. Fully virulent B. anthracis 
have two plasmids: pX01, which codes for the protein exotoxin complex and pX02 which encodes the capsule 
genes. 
Transmission of anthrax relies on ingestion, percutaneous/parenteral inoculation, or inhalation of spores.  
Ingestion of spores is generally associated with drinking from a contaminated water source, or ingesting 
contaminated grazing, browse, flesh or bones. Animals incubating the disease are not infectious for other 
animals until they die and bloody discharges from the orifices contaminate the environment.  Anthrax spores 
survive best in alkaline soils that are rich in calcium and have a relatively high moisture and organic content. 
Spores can survive for years in the environment.  The general pattern of anthrax in endemic regions is sporadic 
cases on an irregular basis, but with some form of seasonal pattern. 
Genetic variation: In West Africa, a unique lineage of B. anthracis deficient in the surface monosaccharide 
anthrose, has been identified in Chad, Cameroon, Mali and Nigeria.  Anthrose is known to play an 
immunodominant role in the anthrose-containing locally produced vaccines. It would seem that this variant is a 
vaccine escape mutant.  
Confounding factor: Bacillus cereus is a close relative of B. anthracis. It is known mainly as a food poisoning 
bacteria. Bacillus anthracis-associated plasmids have been noted among B. cereus isolates, and they might be 
implicated in causing anthrax like disease in animals and humans.  
 
Incidence / Prevalence 
Anthrax is endemic in many countries. Thanks to successful national programs, there has been a progressive 
global reduction of the disease in livestock. Anthrax remains common in tropical Africa, the Middle East, 
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neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union, parts of Central and Southern America, and parts of Asia. The 
number of outbreaks is acknowledged as under reported in many countries, and due to the nature of the 
disease (peracute/acute) there is very limited prevalence data. The WHO estimates between 20,000-100,000 
human cases per year.  
 
Classical diagnostic is based on the identification of the agent in smears.  There are some challenges in obtaining 
the traditional methylene blue stain, so adapted formulations have been proposed.  It might also require expert 
skills to identify the agent. Interestingly, a very promising lateral flow device has been developed by the 
Biological Defense Research Directorate, Naval Medical Research Centre (USNMRC), USA. The test has been 
validated by AgriBio in Australia, which has been using it for several years in the field. Unfortunately, the 
USNMRC has no interest in livestock, and AgriBio is not in a position to commercialize as the IP belongs to 
USNMRC.  This seems an opportunity to follow up on diagnostics.  
 
Control 
Anthrax is usually a notifiable disease, therefore control procedures are usually prescribed and enforced by 
national veterinary services. Anthrax control measures are aimed at breaking the cycle of infection and consist 
basically of a surveillance system, prophylactic procedures, and disease regulatory actions.  
B. anthracis is susceptible to most antibiotics; however, because of the peracute nature of anthrax disease in 
herbivores, by the time the animal shows clinical signs it is usually too late to treat with antibiotics. To treat any 
animal suspected of incubating the disease, the WHO/OIE/FAO recommends the use of penicillin with 
streptomycin. A few countries, do not permit antibiotic treatment, and require instead slaughter with 
appropriate carcass disposal.  With the development of the Sterne spore vaccine, a sharp decline in anthrax 
outbreaks in livestock occurred during the 1930-1980 era.  However, a resurgence of this disease in livestock has 
been reported in some regions, where complacency, a false sense of security or other causes have hindered 
vaccination.   
 
Current vaccines 
Most anthrax vaccines in use in the world at present, utilize the toxigenic, non-capsulating B. anthracis 34F2 
isolated in 1937 by Max Sterne in South Africa. This variant has lost the pX02 plasmid (pX01+, pX02-), and it is 
safe for animals and humans.  It is used essentially as originally formulated, suspended in saponin and glycerol-
saline. The basis of protection is the development of antibodies to the Protective Antigen.  
There are also other livestock vaccines used in specific countries or regions.  The anthrax strain 1190R is used in 
Romania, and the anthrax strain 55 is used mainly in Russia, Central and Eastern Europe.  Both strains are very 
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similar to the Sterne stain (pX01+, pX02-).  The original Pasteur vaccines which are pX01- (Type 1 and Type 2) 
have been largely replaced by the Sterne vaccine. The Pasteur Type 1 was used in Italy until 2006. Type 2 is still 
used in China, but it is unclear to what extent. Italy used to produce the Carbosap vaccine, produced from a 
pX01+, pX02+ strain, but has stopped now.  China also uses the Sterne strain to produce a PA oil emulsion 
vaccine. There are some references about a vaccine K79-Z used in Ukraine, but information is very limited. 
Anthrax vaccines are used alone or in combination.  Sterne strain can be combined with Blackleg disease 
(Clostridium chauvoei) and/or with Botulism (Clostridium botulinum types C and D). 
The Sterne vaccine is cheap, and has been very effective in controlling the disease. It is produced in many 
laboratories worldwide, but quality issues have been encountered. Promoting the production of good quality 
Sterne vaccine (by for example training of African manufacturers at AU-PANVAC), and ensuring the Sterne strain 
they are using is still appropriate, would be of help.  
Despite being a good vaccine, there are important issues that hinder the efficacy of the Sterne vaccine. It is 
affected by the use of antibiotics before and/or after vaccination (which has implications for control measures in 
the face of an outbreak), immunity takes 7-10 days to develop and even longer in horses, precautions might 
need to be taken with goats, and adverse reactions have been notified in miniature horses. There is a need for a 
vaccine that: 1- is not affected by antibiotic treatment, has a stronger initial immunity and can be used at the 
onset of an outbreak, 2- can be given orally (especially for wildlife), 3- it is safer for humans, 4- does not have 
withdrawal period, and 5- has a longer duration of immunity (especially desirable for wildlife).  
 
Potential new vaccines 
The majority of the work on new vaccines has been focused on human vaccines, and there is only very limited 
information on new livestock vaccines. Recombinant protein vaccines have the advantage that they potentially 
would help to overcome the issue of concomitant antibiotic treatment.   
Fasanella in 2008 published work on a recombinant PA (rPA) and a trivalent vaccine (TV). Both vaccines 
produced a quick immune response that persisted at high titres until day 174. Research was discontinued due to 
the cost of the vaccine.    
More recently, the group led by Dr Beyer at the Universität Hohenheim, have been working on evaluating a non-
living vaccine based on the protective antigen (PA83), the spore surface glycoprotein (BclA), a capsule conjugate, 
formalin-inactivated spores (FIS) and a lipopeptide adjuvant (Pam3Cys) in various combinations. They have also 
developed and evaluated DNA-vaccines. In experiments with goats, the recombinant protein based vaccines 
showed up to 80% protection from a lethal challenge if formalin-inactivated spores (FIS) were part of the 
vaccine. In contrast, the DNA-vaccines showed little to no immunogenicity in goats. These recombinant 
candidates look promising, but further development and evaluation (including stability, as long term stability 
issues have been identified with rPA vaccines evaluated for humans) is needed. It is important to keep in mind, 
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that these vaccines will be mainly used for outbreaks, as due to their cost, livestock users wanting to prevent the 
disease, would likely continue to use the cheaper Sterne vaccine.  
A less expensive option than recombinant vaccines, would be the acellular vaccines produced by using the toxins 
as an antigen in an oil emulsion, as currently being used in China, and being researched by Dr Fasanella in Italy.  
 
One important issue that needs to be clarified in West Africa, is the efficacy of the traditional Sterne vaccine 
against the anthrose-deficient strains, as that might help explain some of the vaccine failures observed, that 
have been linked to quality issues (hence might or might not been present also).  A trial evaluating the efficacy 
could be set up with some of the groups working on this subject (and could also include the subunit vaccines 
produced with Sterne toxins). 
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Anthrax is a peracute, acute or subacute, highly contagious disease of domestic and wild animals and humans, 
caused by the bacterium Bacillus anthracis. Anthrax appears to be the first disease of humans and animals that 
was shown to be caused by a micro-organism. Anthrax was also the first disease against which avirulent strains 
were used as immunizing agents in vaccines. It is also one of the few pathogens that must kill its host in order to 
propagate.  
B. anthracis is also known for its use as an agent in biological warfare during and after the II World War, and 
subsequent threats during the Gulf war, and bioterrorism. It was calculated that the economic impact of such an 
act in the USA could amount to $26.2 billion per 100,000 persons exposed.  
Anthrax retains a continued place in the ecology of free-ranging wildlife in several regions of the world.  
 
Etiology & Epidemiology 
 
Bacillus anthracis is a bacterium belonging to the family Bacillaceae.  The genus Bacillus includes many species, 
which are all aerobic and spore forming. Bacillus anthracis appears to be a relatively monomorphic species. 
Recent progress using molecular techniques has enabled a broad separation of isolates into 2 major clonal 
groups, referred to as A and B.  The A and B2 branch isolates are distributed worldwide, while the B1 branch is 
found only in Southern Africa [1]. It has also been shown that genomics has a strong impact on strain distribution, 
and this includes the possibility of niche specialisation within a sublineage (see B. anthracis lineages).  
Actively growing, Bacillus anthracis are typically rod-shaped, and in stained smears of blood or tissue fluid 
obtained from infected animals, the organisms appear truncated, commonly singly or in short chains, and 
surrounded by a well-developed capsule.  Capsules are not formed in culture unless special conditions for their 
development are provided. In vitro, B. anthracis grows in long, undulant chains composed of many individuals, 
which resemble a bamboo pole.  Between outbreaks, the anthrax bacterium survives in the environment as a 
highly resistant spore.  
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B. anthracis is not a highly invasive organism. The 50% lethal dose for anthrax challenge is much higher by the 
oral route than by the parenteral route.  A major factor determining virulence is the number of plasmids 
present. Fully virulent B. anthracis have two plasmids: pX01, which codes for the protein exotoxin complex and 
pX02 which encodes the capsule genes. The vegetative anthrax bacilli produce a lethal combination of exotoxins, 
responsible for the severe clinical signs and post-mortem lesions.  The toxin complex consists of 2 separate 
protein toxins, designated oedema factor (OF) and lethal factor (LF), and a cell receptor-binding protein called 
protective antigen (PA). Protective antigen combines with OF or LF to form oedema toxin (OT) and lethal toxin 
(LT) respectively. The toxin complex acts to reduce phagocytosis, increase capillary permeability and 
compromise blood clotting mechanism. The net effect is massive oedema (including in the lungs and brain), 
haemorrhage, renal failure and terminal hypoxia. The different mammals have different sensitivity to these 
toxins.  
The bacterium first multiplies at the site of infection. Then enters the bloodstream, where it is concentrated by 
the spleen and the other lymphoid tissues until a point is reached when there is a sudden release of organisms 
and toxins back into the bloodstream, which leads to rapid death in ruminants.  
 
Transmission 
Transmission of anthrax relies on ingestion, percutaneous/parenteral inoculation, or inhalation of spores.  
Ingestion of spores is generally associated with drinking from a contaminated water source, or ingesting 
contaminated grazing, browse, flesh or bones. Animals incubating the disease are not infectious for other 
animals until they die and bloody discharges from the orifices spill infection into the environment.  The curiosity 
of cohort animals, which causes sniffing, licking and grazing infected sites, leads to other animals being infected.  
Since B. anthracis is apparently non-invasive, it is believed that a lesion is necessary for the initiation of 
infection.  In view of associations between higher incidence and dry hot conditions, theories have arisen that at 
such times the animal is forced to graze dry spiky grass close to the soil, which produces orogastrointestinal 
lesions. But this is not totally consistent with some epidemiological observations.  
Ingestion is probably the most common route of infection in animals. In predators and pigs, oedematous lesions 
generally develop in the oral and pharyngeal area, while in domestic and wild herbivores, necro-haemorrhagic 
lesions develop in Peyer’s patches or regions of the small intestine, eventually progressing to septicaemia. 
Osteophagia by pregnant or lactating animals, or animals on rangeland with phosphate deficient soils, is an 
important cause of infection in certain regions.   
B. anthracis may penetrate broken skin or mucous membranes, and this route of infection is most commonly 
seen in humans who have handled anthrax infected animal products. The animal equivalent is the infection of 
subcutaneous tissues, generally as a result of mechanical transmission by contaminated biting insects. Cellulitis 
characterised by subcutaneous swelling is particularly common in horses and pigs.  In carnivores, the massive 
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facial and oral oedema and necrosis are thought to be due to penetration of oral or pharyngeal mucous 
membranes by bones. 
Inhalation is probably the least common route of infection in livestock and wildlife living in the open air, as 
anthrax spores tend to clump together with surrounding organic material and are not easily aerosolised.  
During an anthrax outbreak, each successive victim may become an additional source of infection. The modes of 
transmission from the infected carcass or bacteraemic animals to the surrounding population at risk will vary in 
the different environments with their associated species.  Anthrax spores may directly contaminate pasture in 
close proximity to a carcass, and terminally ill animals that are febrile and thirsty may die close to water. The 
bacilli and spores from a carcass may also be dispersed by water run-off, scavenging birds and carnivorous 
mammals. Vegetative anthrax do not survive the digestive processes of carnivorous birds and mammals, but the 
spores pass through the gastrointestinal tract to indirectly contaminate distant sites.  In South Africa, browse 
contamination occurs through non-biting necrophagic flies which fed on the body fluids and proteins of infected 
carcasses, and then set on nearby vegetation depositing infectious vomit and faecal droplets.  Necrophagic flies 
are “case multipliers”, while in certain regions, haemophagic biting flies have been implicated as important 
mechanical transmitters in herbivores, acting as “space multipliers” by causing local clustering and centrifugal 
spatial spread of infection.  
Anthrax spores survive best in alkaline soils that are rich in calcium and have a relatively high moisture and 
organic content. Spores can survive for years in the environment and, under optimal conditions, some may 
survive for decades or even centuries [1]. Spores can also survive for two years in water, 10 years in milk and up 
to 71 years on silk threads.  
The general pattern of anthrax in endemic regions is that of sporadic cases on irregular basis, but with some 
form of seasonal pattern.  These sporadic events are intermixed with periodic outbreak clusters, or even 
propagating epidemics that are generally linked to increased densities or concentrations of host species, or 
abundance of arthropod vectors. The typical “Anthrax seasons” are characterized by hot-dry weather which 
stresses animals and reduces their innate resistance to infection allowing low doses of spores to be infective [2]. 
During outbreaks in winter, the infection by ingestion is the most common route, while summer outbreaks are 
generally associated with peaking populations of flying insects and percutaneous transmission.  
Despite being a well-known disease, there are still epidemiological questions that are not answered.   The 
reason why large outbreaks usually affect only one species in the affected area, while the incidence in others, 
equally susceptible species in the vicinity remains sporadic is not known.  But it might be explained by the 
different ecological niches of the various species.   Susceptibility data based on experimental results do not 
correlate well with the deaths under natural circumstances.  Cattle are quite resistant to experimental infection, 
but are very prone to infection in nature.  In contrast, sheep are quite susceptible to experimental infection but 
may not be so readily infected in nature. Goats, despite being even more susceptible than sheep to 
experimental infection, account for even fewer cases than sheep. In the wild, there is an apparent preference 
for a particular species in any one region.  Zebras for example, are the most commonly affected in the Etosha 
National Park (Namibia), with kudu only occasionally affected. In the Kruger National Park (South Africa), kudu is 
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the principal host, accounting for over 50% of all cases.   It would seem that grazing, browsing and flies are the 
main variables in the different transmission equations. Other important aspects are how plants are eaten: 
bovines pull plants out of the ground, ingesting a lot of soil, while in contrast, sheep and horses bite plants at 
ground level, taking relatively little soil.  
 
B. anthracis lineages  
Epidemiological or forensic investigations of anthrax benefit from the ability to subtype and geo-position the 
pathogen.  Effective sub-typing systems for the pathogen exist, including systems based on single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs), variable number tandem repeats (VNTRs) within a multiple locus VNTR analysis (MLVA), 
and single nucleotide repeat (SNRs). In particular, VNTR genotyping has described the diversity of the pathogen 
in numerous countries. 
Lista et al. [3] subtyped strains from Cameroon using a 25-marker MLVA, assigning them to a unique “E” lineage. 
A later study examined the molecular diversity of B. anthracis in Chad using VNTRs and concluded the strains 
represented a novel and phylogenetically distinct A lineage, termed Aβ [4]. Most recently, these same authors 
examined bovine strains from seven sites in Cameroon and determined they were highly genetically similar to 
Chadian strains and were also assigned to the Aβ branch [5].  In 2015, it has been published by Blackburn et al [6], 
that MLVA-25 subtyping of Nigerian, Chadian and Cameroonian isolates indicates that they are closely related 
genetically, providing evidence that the lineage is widespread in cattle in this West African region.  
 
Relevance to vaccine protection 
The surfaces of B. anthracis expose a pentasaccharide containing an unusual terminal monosaccharide called 
anthrose, which has been considered for use as a vaccine (or target for diagnostics). Surprisingly, none of the 
isolates from Chad, Cameroon and Mali evaluated by Tamborrini [7] were recognized by the MAb specific for 
anthrose oligosaccharides, suggesting that these West African isolates from the same lineage, are unable to 
produce anthrose.  Immunization of cattle in Chad with a locally produced anthrax vaccine based on anthrose-
positive spores of the Sterne strain, elicited an anti-carbohydrate IgG response specific for a synthetic anthrose-
containing tetrasaccharide.  Further studies suggested an immunodominant role of the anthrose-containing 
carbohydrate in cattle. The geographic correlation of massive vaccination with the live vaccine strain Sterne (See 
Section 6), which produces an antigenic response to anthrose, with the lack of anthrose positive B. anthracis 
field strains specifically in this area, leads to the hypothesis that the latter strains represent escape mutants. This 
hypothesis could be tested by comparing the protective efficacy of a Sterne vaccine and vaccine derived from 
anthrose deficient B. anthracis strain towards anthrose-producing and anthrose-deficient strains. Blackburn [6], 
who tested Nigerian isolates dating 60 years ago in Nigeria, suggests that this escape mutation was present at 
least 60 years ago, a timeframe consistent with the mass introduction of the Sterne vaccine in the continent.   
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Bacillus cereus and its implication in anthrax-like disease 
Bacillus cereus is a close relative of B. anthracis. It is known mainly as a food poisoning bacteria, able to cause 
diarrhea and vomiting, but also more severe infections. Bacillus anthracis-like plasmids have been noted among 
B. cereus, and they might be implicated in causing anthrax like disease. Bacillus isolates causing anthrax in 
chimpanzees in Ivory Coast, have been found to have chromosomal properties of B. cereus combined with B. 
anthracis virulence plasmids [8]. Also human cases of anthrax like disease have been associated to the presence 
of B. anthracis plasmids in B. cereus [9]. 
In a recent study by Kaminska [10], isolates of B. cereus from Argentina, Kazakhstan, Kenya and Poland were 
investigated. The plasmids were found in about 17% of the isolates, but their frequencies and expression of 
replicons differed within and between populations.  




In most species anthrax is characterized by the development of a rapidly fatal septicaemia, resulting in sudden 
death. The principal lesions are widespread oedema, haemorrhage and necrosis. 
Animals  
The incubation period under natural conditions, probably ranges from 1 to 14 days. Most animals develop a 
fever but its severity is extremely variable. It appears to be characteristic for a species and may depend on the 
number of infecting organisms. The fever usually declines before death.   
Ruminants and hindgut digesting herbivores are the most susceptible. Carnivores and primates (including 
humans) are more resistant to infection, and ostriches the only avian species in which natural infection has been 
regularly reported. Carcass scavengers are usually highly resistant. Although predators are in general less 
susceptible to infection by B. anthracis, they are highly vulnerable to massive exposure when they feed on 
infected carcasses, ingesting billions of organisms.  Clinical cases in predators are generally more common 
during the early phases of an epidemic in a new area. Then, they seem to develop strong immunity.  
Innate resistance to anthrax appears to depend on the inhibition of the initial germination of spores and/or 
multiplication of the bacteria.  Carnivores, rats and chickens appear to have a high resistance to infection, but 
once infected, are highly susceptible to the effects of the toxins – as infection progresses, they develop a low-
level bacteraemia in the terminal septicaemia.  On the other hand, animals such as herbivores, mice, guinea-pigs 
and rabbits, have a much lower resistance to infection and a relatively high resistance to the toxins, so they 
develop a high-level bacteraemia in the terminal septicaemia. 
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Three different manifestations are recognized: peracute, acute and subacute to chronic forms.  Cattle, sheep, 
goats and some wild ruminants, such as kudu, mainly manifest the peracute and acute forms.  Horses, donkeys 
and zebra suffer the acute form.  Omnivores (e.g. pigs), carnivores and immunized animals, usually present the 
subacute to chronic form.  
• Peracute form: The course of the disease is usually less than 2 hours. The majority of the animals are 
found dead without having shown any signs of illness. If there are clinical signs, they include pyrexia, 
restlessness or anxiety, muscle tremors, dyspnoea, congestion, ruminal stasis, collapse and terminal 
convulsions.  Blood-stained fluid sometimes exudes from the nostrils, mouth and anus.   
• Acute form:  The course of the disease is usually less than 72 hours.  The animals remain standing with 
their heads hanging and their eyes staring, they are depressed, lag behind the others, walk about 
listlessly, and lie down frequently.  Respiration is laboured and rapid, and scattered small haemorrhages 
may occur in the visible mucous membranes and skin. Some animals may develop diarrhoea, which is 
usually haemorrhagic. In lactating cows, milk production decreases, and the small amount of milk 
produced is either blood stained or yellow.  Pregnant animals may abort. Oedema of the tongue and 
subcutaneous tissues in the throat and ventral parts of the thorax, abdomen and perineum may occur.  
• Subacute to chronic form: The course of the disease usually extends for more than 3 days before 
recovery or death occurs. The most frequent sign is an oedematous swelling of the face, throat and neck 
following primary infection of the pharynx, pharyngeal tissues and regional lymph nodes.  The swelling 
in the pharyngeal region may become so extensive, that it interferes with respiration (and may result in 
asphyxia) and the ingestion of food and water.  
 
Humans  
Depending on the route of exposure, natural anthrax infection in man can take 3 forms: cutaneous, gastro-
intestinal or most seriously, pneumonic anthrax.  Recently, a fourth form, injectional anthrax, due to the intake 





Is not recommended, because opening the carcass favours sporulation. Regulations in most countries prohibit 
the opening and post-mortem examination of animals where anthrax is suspected. There is also a zoonotic risk 
for the person conducting the examination. Animals that have died suddenly, usually in good condition, where 
rigor mortis is incomplete or absent, and rapid bloating occurs are suspicious. Blood-stained fluid may exude 
from one or more body orifices.  Petechiae and echymoses are often present. The blood is dark and tarry, and 
frequently does not clot.  
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Important samples to collect are blood smears for light microscopy and cotton swabs or filter paper blots of 
blood for culture. These swabs/blots should be allowed to dry to reduce viable contaminants. Although blood 
samples and smears are preferable, an ear could be cut off, placed in a plastic bag, and transported 
appropriately to the laboratory.  
OIE recognized tests 
Identification of the agent:  
• Smears of blood or tissues from fresh anthrax-infected carcasses 
• Culture on blood agar plates 
• Identity confirmation: gamma phage lysis and penicillin susceptibility.  
• Capsule visualisation: Smears from blood from ear veins or peripheral veins, exudate from orifices, and, 
for horses and pigs, from oedematous fluid or superficial lymph nodes. The smears should be dried, 
fixed either using heat or by dipping in 95-100% alcohol for about 1 minute and air dried, and then 
stained with polychrome methylene blue (PBM -MacFaydean’s reaction). The capsule stains pink, and 
the bacillus cell stain dark blue. The capsule is not present on B. anthracis grown aerobically on nutrient 
agar or in nutrient broths, but can be seen when the virulent bacterium is cultured for a few hours in a 
few millilitres of blood. Visualisation of the encapsulated bacilli, usually in large numbers, in a blood 
smear with PMB is fully diagnostic.  
• Difficulties may arise in the case of pigs and carnivores in which the terminal bacteraemia is frequently 
not marked, or in animals that receive antibiotics before death. 
• Recovery from decomposed carcasses, processed specimens (bone meal, hides) or environmental 
samples (contaminated soil) is often difficult.  
Immunological detection and diagnosis 
• B. anthracis is antigenically very closely related to B. cereus, which is considered a ubiquitous 
component of the environmental microflora. The only unshared antigens are the anthrax toxin antigens 
produced during the exponential phase of growth, and the capsule of B. anthracis.  
• Ascoli test: Antiserum raised in rabbits is sued to produce a precipitin reaction. The test lacks high 
specificity, and appears to be used only in Eastern Europe.  
• ELISAs have been developed for the detection of antibody, particularly to the protective antigen. But 
these tests are only carried out in specialist research laboratories and their results have to be 
interpreted with a knowledge of an animal’s anthrax vaccine history.   
• Immunofluorescence: for capsule observation. Not used for routine diagnosis.  
Confirmation of virulence with the polymerase chain reaction  
• PCR to confirm the presence of the pX01 and pX02 plasmids. Primers mentioned by the OIE Manual 
have been used in pure cultures or isolates from animals, humans and environmental samples. They 
may be unsuitable for direct detection, and alternatives for that are published elsewhere.  
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A skin hypersensitivity test using Anthracin T is widely used in some countries for the retrospective diagnosis of 
anthrax in animals and humans.  
There are no tests available to determine if animal products are free of contamination with B. anthracis spores. 
Recent developments: 
▪ The simple polychrome methylene blue (PMB) staining established in 1903 remained 
accepted as a highly reliable, rapid diagnostic test for anthrax for six decades 
throughout the world. Improvements in disease control led to anthrax becoming rare in 
industrialized countries and less frequent in developing countries with the result that 
quality controlled, commercially produced PMB became hard to obtain by the 1980s. 
Mixed results with alternative methylene blue-based stains then led to diagnosis 
failures, confusion among practitioners and mistrust of this procedure as a reliable test 
for anthrax. The traditional PMB preparation as described in the OIE Manual, should be 
allowed to stand exposed to the air, with occasional shaking for at least one year to 
oxidise and mature. Owen et al in 2013 [12] published that for laboratories needing a 
reliable M'Fadyean stain at short notice, the best approach is to have available 
commercially pure azure B ready to constitute into a solution of 0.03 g azure B in 3 ml of 
95% ethanol or methanol to which is then added 10 ml of 0.01% KOH (0.23% final azure 
B concentration) and which can then be used immediately and through to the end of the 
tests. Stored in the dark at room temperature, the shelf life is at least 12 months. 
Smears should be fixed with ethanol or methanol (95-100%), not by heat, and the stain 
left for 5 min before washing off for optimum effect.  
▪ A lateral flow device has been developed the Biological Defence Research Directorate, 
Naval Medical Research Centre, USA and AgriBio in Australia [13]. The anthrax 
immunochromatographic test (AICT) detects PA present within the blood of an animal 
that has died from anthrax, and provides results in 15 minutes. The diagnostic specificity 
of the test was estimated to be 100% (99.4–100%; 95% CI) and the diagnostic sensitivity 
was estimated to be 93.1% (83.3–98.1%; 95% CI).  Please see additional information on 
Section 7.  
Most commonly used in low & middle income countries: 
o National laboratory: smears and cultures.  
Main needs for diagnostics: 
a) A diagnostic test that could be used at the point of care by Primary Animal Health Care (PAHC) 
providers.  
b) Tests that can determine if animal products are contaminated with anthrax 
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Anthrax should be considered in the differential diagnosis of all cases of sudden death in grazing animals, 
especially when blood-stained exudate is present at the mouth, nose or anus.  Anthrax cases are most often 
misdiagnosed as clostridial diseases such as: 
o Blackleg (Clostridium chauvoei) 
o Black disease (Clostridium novyi) 
o Malignant oedema (Clostridium septicum) and  
o Enterotoxaemia (Clostridium perfringens type D) 
B. anthracis is a member of the Bacillus cereus group, which also contains B. cereus and B. thuringiensis.  
Plasmids closely related to pX01 and pX02 have recently been found in a few B. cereus isolates that caused 




Anthrax is an important zoonotic disease and the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that between 
20,000 and 100,000 human cases occur globally per year (Dr Sadjinou presentation at FAO/WHO/OIE meeting in 
Togo, September 2015).  Evidence suggests that humans are relatively resistant to anthrax. The clinical 
classification refers to the route of infection, that is cutaneous, enteric or inhalational (pulmonary).  Cutaneous 
anthrax accounts for 95% of human cases reported.  It is an occupational disease, related to butchering or 
handling meat from infected animals. Suspected transmission of anthrax to humans by biting flies during animal 
outbreaks has also been recorded.  Infections in drug users have resulted from the infection of heroin 
contaminated with anthrax spores.   
Cutaneous anthrax is characterised by a pruritic papule, which develops around vesicles plus regional oedema. 
The lesion ulcerates to form a painless scar, with a black necrotic centre. Uncomplicated cases will heal with 
minimal scarring.  Antibiotic treatment does not stop or reverse the development of the skin lesion, but 
prevents bacteraemia and systemic spread.  If untreated, 20% of the cases will progress to severe systemic, and 
potentially fatal infections.  
Enteric anthrax is more common in rural areas of the developing world where carcasses are considered a 
windfall by protein deprived people. The source of infection is probably a large dose of vegetative bacilli in raw 
or undercooked meat, rather than spores.  There are 2 patterns of the disease: oropharyngeal and intestinal. 
The oropharyngeal infection may occasionally compromise the airway, and systemic sepsis may occur (as with 
all forms of anthrax).  The intestinal form, depending on its severity may resolve, respond to treatment, or 
progress to bloody diarrhoea, acute abdomen followed by shock and death.  
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Inhalation anthrax was historically an occupational disease for wool sorters handling the skins or wool of 
infected sheep. More recently has been described in musicians playing drums covered with skins from anthrax 
infected carcasses. Initially it presents as an influenza like illness, that progresses to dyspnoea, shock and 
collapse, followed by sepsis and death.   
In recent decades, anthrax has been propagated for biological warfare and bioterrorism.  
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Anthrax occurs nearly worldwide, and only a few countries have never reported the disease. Thanks to successful national 
programs, there has been a progressive global reduction of the disease in livestock. It is acknowledged as under reported in 
many countries, and is still common in tropical Africa, the Middle East and neighboring countries of the former Soviet Union, 
parts of Central and Southern America, and parts of Asia.  
Anthrax is absent or only sporadic in the middle and higher latitudes of Europe and the Russian Federation. But is still common 
in some countries bordering the Mediterranean (Albania, Greece, southern Italy, Spain and Turkey).  In Canada it is present 
in the Wood Bison National Park, and it is sporadic in Southern Alberta and Saskatchewan. Also in southern Manitoba.  In the 
USA, the disease is confined to a few persistent pockets in North and South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada and Texas. 
The true situation in Latin America is uncertain, because the disease is frequently ignored and underreported.  There is a lack 
of diagnostic facilities, and is enzootic in El Salvador, Guatemala and Mexico. It is absent in Belize and all of the Caribbean 
except for Haiti. The situation in Colombia is not clear. The disease is well reported in Chile, and it is enzootic in Argentina, 
Bolivia and Peru, and sporadic in western Uruguay and in parts of Brazil.  
In South Africa occurs in wildlife in the Kruger National Park, as in the national parks in Botswana, Namibia, Uganda and 
Tanzania. The efficient control programs of the past in Zimbabwe and Zambia are a matter of the past, and the disease is now 
hyperendemic, with significant human losses each year.  Epidemics occur in Chad and Ethiopia.   
Anthrax is a severe problem in southern and eastern India, with a significant human incidence because the disease is poorly 
controlled.  Outbreaks in wildlife also occur. It is absent however from the western state because of the low soil pH. The 
disease is a continuing problem in western China, but sporadic in the eastern provinces.  Thailand, although essentially free, 
is afflicted by infected animals imported from Myanmar. The disease is endemic in Cambodia, Vietnam and a number of 
Indonesian islands.  Malaysia is free. Sporadic outbreaks have occurred in China, Taiwan, Japan, Philippines and the Republic 
of Korea. The situation in the Democratic Republic of Korea is unknown.   
An increasing number of countries have been free from Anthrax for a considerable time – Cyprus (1969), New Zealand (1954), 
Sweden (1981), Ireland (1970) and Malta (1974). 
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Incidence data by country 
There are two main sources, OIE and AU-IBAR (which includes only Africa), but data are not always similar.   
Additionally, due to the particularities of the anthrax disease (peracute and acute forms, characterized by the 
development of a rapid fatal septicaemia, resulting in sudden death, and showing a general pattern in endemic 
regions of sporadic cases), there is no prevalence data, but there is some data on outbreaks and cases that falls 
under incidence.  This information has also been included.  
• Sources used were PubMed and internet engine searches in English (and French for fievre charbonneuse 
when applicable).  
• Efforts have been made to include the year of the study, and not the year of the publication. If they are 
known to be different, the year of publication is included in the reference.  
• For grey literature, links have been included when possible.   
• Note that not all papers have been read in full. In many cases, only the abstracts have been read. Critical 
evaluation of the papers for inclusion has not been conducted.  
 
1- Source: OIE.   
Data of outbreaks reported to the World Animal Health Organization (OIE) are shown in Tables 1 and 2.  Data 
are not always reliable, as many countries do not seem to report, or to be reporting consistently over time.   
http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/statusdetail 
Similar information but presented in a different manner can be seen in Annex 1.   
 
Table 1: ASIA - Anthrax outbreaks notified to OIE from the Asian countries of interest. 
 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bangladesh - - + + + + + + + - - 
India 119 113 111 68 60 84 48 32 29 55 - 
Indonesia + + + >2 - + + + 6 - - 
Myanmar + 7 5 9 10 5 5 4 1 0 - 
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Nepal 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 + 5 0 
Vietnam 5 0 3 3 + + >3 >1 1 1 0 
 
Number of cases reported to the OIE by disease and by country: 
     -   No information,      +   Present but quantitative data not known,   ?  Disease suspected 
 
Table 2: AFRICA - Anthrax outbreaks notified to OIE from the Asian countries of interest.  
 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Burkina Faso 15 21 11 11 6 19 5 9 5 3 4 
Ethiopia 179 2254 755 430 >215 627 340 638 491 145  
Ivory Coast + 0 4 >2 >2 6 12 + 1 0 0 
Kenya 10 53 39 11 31 32 16 10 8 24 6 
Madagascar 1 6 >1 + ? 0 0 0 0 0  
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - 
Mali 3 2 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
Mozambique 3 + 0 1 0 ? 0 0 0 0  
Rwanda  26 >22 28 ? + - - ? - - 
Senegal 2 0 1 5 1 2 2 3 7 >1 + 
South Africa 1 8 8 7 9 205 27 110 38 146 - 
Tanzania 14 12 14 + >4 5 + >1 + + 1 
Uganda + ? 0 0 0 2 1 + + 0 - 
Zambia - 2 4 7 7 6 5 2 2 3 - 
 
Number of cases reported to the OIE by disease and by country: 
     -   No information,      +   Present but quantitative data not known,   ?  Disease suspected 
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The OIE, also includes zoonoses data. The number of human cases and deaths are reported by the countries. 
Data from the countries of interest, can be seen in the table below.  
http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/public/wahid.php/Countryinformation/Zoonoses  
 






2- Source: AU-IBAR. 
The African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources also has a notification system. Data are published 
in the Pan African Animal Resources Year Books. (http://www.au-ibar.org/pan-african-animal-resources-
yearbook?showall=&limitstart=). Similarly to the OIE, many countries do not seem to consistently report the 
outbreaks.   Note that the number of outbreaks reported often does not match those reported to the OIE. 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Bangladesh C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: 225
India C: 210, D: 58 C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: +
Indonesia C: 25 C: 15, D: 1 C: 74, D: 5 C: 20, D: 0 C: 31, D: 1 C: 41, D:0 C: 11, D: 1
Myanmar C: 14, D: 0 C: 7, D: 0 C: 7, D: 0 C: 12, D:0 C: 38, D: 0 C: 23, D:0
Nepal
Vietnam C: +, D: + C: 6, D: 0 C: +, D: +
Burkina Faso C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: 1244 D:25
Ethiopia C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: +
Ivory Coast C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: 5, D: 3 C: 5, D: 3
Kenya C: 10, D: 0 C: 19, D: 2 C: 9, D: 0 C: 15, D: 0 C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: 134, D: 0
Madagascar
Malawi C: +, D: +
Mali C: +, D: +
Mozambique
Rwanda C: 18, D: 3 C: +, D: +
Senegal
South Africa C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: +
Tanzania C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: +, D: + C: 47, D: 7
Uganda
Zambia C: 233, D: 6
C: Cases
D: Deaths
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Table 4: Human cases and deaths due to Anthrax as reported to the OIE. 
 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Burkina Faso  19  20 6 19 5 9 5 3  
Ethiopia   478 1997 NS 489 452 601 1067 498  
Ivory Coast    3 2 6 12 5    
Kenya  28 18 5 NS  5  2 20  
Madagascar  21 2 0        
Malawi            
Mali    5 4   1    
Mozambique            
Rwanda    29 NS 18 25 19 19   
Senegal  12  15 1 2 1 4 6   
South Africa  19 9 46 3 195  98 46 145  
Tanzania  16 12  NS NS  1 1 1  
Uganda      2 5 2  2  
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The animal anthrax, locally known as ‘Torka’, is believed to have been enzootic in Bangladesh for a long time, 
and historically human outbreaks were always preceded by animal outbreaks. 
There is data available on anthrax human cases from the Institute of Epidemiology, Disease Control and 
Research of Bangladesh (IEDCR).  See Fig 1 for the map of cutaneous anthrax in Bangladesh. 
http://www.iedcr.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=66&Itemid=88 
Currently, there is the Bangladesh anthrax project, under the One Health Network South Asia. 
http://www.onehealthnetwork.asia/sites/bangladesh-anthrax-project 
Data of anthrax outbreaks in Bangladesh is shown in Table 5 below.  
Table 5: Anthrax outbreaks in Bangladesh. 
 
Year Area Species  No. of cases Reference 
2014 Various Humans (cutaneous 
anthrax) 
Shirajganj: 42, Meherpur: 149 
Narayanganj: 8, Tangail: 26 
IEDCR (see link in note 
under Bangladesh) 
2013 Various Humans (cutaneous 
anthrax) 
Shirajganj: 23, Tangail: 77 
Gopalpur: 37, Meherpur: 187 
Chadanga: 40 
IEDCR (see link in note 
under Bangladesh) 
2012 Various Humans (cutaneous 
anthrax) 
Shirajganj: 74, Kushtia: 5 
Bogra: 16, Tangail: 14, Meherpur: 67 




Buffaloes, cattle and 
goats  




goats and sheep. 
1668 Mondal, 2014 [14] 
 
2011 Various Humans (cutaneous 
anthrax) 
Rajshaji: 21, Shirajgang: 65 
Meherpur: 53, Tangail: 29 
IEDCR (see link in note 
under Bangladesh) 
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Bogra: 40, Pabna: 32 







Humans Sirajgani: 61, Pabna: 32 
Bogra: 28, Meherpur: 39, Tangail: 14 




Various Humans (cutaneous 
anthrax) 
Pabna: 69, Sirajganj: 219 
Kushtia: 49, Tangail: 26 
Meherpur: 82, Manikganj: 8 
Shatkhira: 1, Lalmonirhat: 107 
Rajshahi: 8, Narayangonj: 12 
Laxmipur: 25, Chittagong: 1 





goats and sheep. 
2174 Mondal, 2014 [14] 
 




Fasanella, 2013 [16] 
2009-
2010 
14 outbreaks Cattle, goats, sheep 
Humans 
Animals: 140 (cattle 69%, goats 29%, 
sheep 2%), Humans: 243 






The disease is enzootic in India. During 2014, there were 30 outbreaks reported in cattle (involving 1878 dead 
animals) and 25 in small ruminants (involving 302 animals).  Source: Annual report 2014-2015. Department of 
Animal Husbandry, Dairying & Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India. 
http://dahd.nic.in/dahd/WriteReadData/Animal%20Husbandry%20English%202014-15%20(1).pdf 
During 1991-2010, anthrax was reported in eighteen states of India viz., Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, 
Chhattisgarh, Gujrat, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Odisha, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal. In India, the outbreaks 
usually affect cattle, followed by sheep/goat, buffalo, pig and elephant. The number of outbreaks decreased in 
2007-08 and maintained at approx. 60 outbreaks per year in subsequent years.  The cumulative outbreak data of 
bovines from 2001-2010, shows the higher number of outbreaks in West Bengal (142), with a total of 631 cases 
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and 564 deaths. The highest number of outbreaks in small ruminants, especially sheep, are recorded in AP and 
Karnataka, which might reflect the high sheep population in those areas (Source: Vision 2030 - Project 





Figure 1: Cutaneous anthrax in Bangladesh 2010 – 2014. (Source: IEDCR. 
http://www.iedcr.org/pdf/files/anthrax/Anthrax_2010-14_1.pdf) 
 
A seasonal fluctuation in the number of anthrax outbreaks has been observed. Most of the anthrax outbreaks 
are reported in post-monsoon season, from July to September and November to January in different parts of 
India. Several Southern states such as Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Karnataka and Orissa are common 
endemic regions with sporadic human anthrax cases reported from time to time. From the Union Territory of 
Pondicherry, 28 cases of anthrax were detected in 1999 and 2000. Both, animal as well as human anthrax cases 
are reported usually from certain anthrax endemic districts like Chittoor, Cuddapah, Guntur, Prakasam and 
Nellore of Andhra Pradesh. In 2006, some cases were noticed near Narsinghpur, Madhya Pradesh also. In 2007, 
20 people were affected in two cutaneous anthrax outbreaks in Murshidabad district, West Bengal. These 
anthrax outbreaks were caused due to slaughtering of sick cattle and subsequently handling of meat without 
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taking proper preventive measures. An increase in number of animal and human anthrax cases has been 
observed in this area in recent past. During a tenure of 10 years, anthrax outbreaks were reported at least 61 
times from Orissa affecting 750 people. The outbreak of anthrax is a common phenomenon in this area because 
the tribal population mainly depends on forests for livelihood. Most of the human anthrax cases occur in 
agricultural workers due to handling of meat or hides of diseased animal. An anthrax outbreak was reported in 
Orissa, India in 2013 where several people died due to consumption of infected goat meat. Recently, nine 
cutaneous anthrax cases were reported from the tribal populations of Midnapur, West Bengal in India [18]. 







Figure 2: Occurrence of Anthrax in India 1991-2010.   
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No publications found on ProMed. 
Information from the Jakarta Post mentions that anthrax is endemic in parts of Indonesia. The disease was first 
recorded in Indonesia in 1885; Jambi, Bogor and Purwakarta in West Java, Boyolali and Salatiga in Central Java 
and Sumbawa, West Nusa Tenggara, are endemic areas. 
(http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2001/10/20/anthrax-endemic-parts-indonesia.html) 
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There is also information on the internet, about an outbreak in which more than 100 cattle and buffaloes have 




No information available on PubMed or on the internet for incidence or prevalence.  
 
Nepal 
No information available on PubMed or on the internet for incidence or prevalence.  
 
Vietnam 
No information available on PubMed. 
2014: A case involving nine people, including adults and children with symptoms of cutaneous anthrax was 
reported in the northern Ha Giang province, during Sept/Oct 2014. http://outbreaknewstoday.com/vietnam-
province-reports-9-cases-of-cutaneous-anthrax-91036  
2011: The Vietnam Administration of Preventive Medicine notified that the provinces of Lai Chau, Dien Bien and 
Ha Giang experienced anthrax outbreaks in humans.  In Dien Bien Province, the first anthrax case was reported 
after an ethnic minority resident slaughtered two buffaloes that had died from diseases, and invited other 






No recent publications found on PubMed. No information found on the internet in English or French. 
Information obtained from the presenation by Dr Estelle Kanyala, Coordinator of the surveillance network of 
animal diseases (from the Burkinabe DVS office) at the Regional meeting on Anthrax in West Africa organised by 
FAO in Togo in September 2015. The presentation is not available on line, but was obtained from Dr Bedane of 
FAO.  
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The species affected were bovine (39 outbreaks) and sheep (1 outbreak). 
 
Human outbreaks: 





Figure 4: Anthrax human outbreaks in Burkina Faso 2010 – 2014 (Source: Dr Kanyala, Togo 2015) 
 
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Outbreaks 21 5 6 5 3 
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The presentation makes emphasis on the importance of transhumant movement at national and international 
level. 
 
Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) 
There is very limited information, and it mainly refers to wildlife.  
2001/2: Anthrax was reported in a group of chimpanzees [20] with sudden death from the Taï National Park. 
Further studies revealed that the B. anthracis strain isolated, belonged to a different group than the traditional 
A and B and it was classified in a new group called F [21]. 
 
Ethiopia 
Anthrax is endemic in Ethiopia. It occurs in May and June every year (‘anthrax season’) in several farming 
localities of the country, causing disease both in humans and livestock.  And although suspected cases of anthrax 
are reported from several districts, few of these are officially confirmed [22]. 
2012: Report of 3 human cases linked to eating animals that presumably died of anthrax, in West Arsi province 
(SE Ethiopia). http://www.revclinesp.es/es/brote-carbunco-una-zona-rural/articulo/S0014256512002792/ 
2011-2012: Three patients with periocular anthrax were seen at Jimma University Specialized Hospital, Ethiopia 
from June 2011 to May 2012 [23]. They were all farmers and had contact with animals.  
2002: Case reported in Wabessa village in the Dessie Zuria. The number of infected animals was 1 cow, 8 
donkeys and 17 goats and the fatality rate in all cases was 100%, giving mortality rates of 7.7% (cattle), 47.1% 
(donkeys) and 32.7% (goats). The outbreak also gave rise to three unconfirmed human cases and three 
unconfirmed deaths. The cutaneous form of anthrax was observed in five of the patients, while three of the 
patients complained of abdominal pain. The human cases were related to direct contact with infected material 
and the consumption of infected meat [22]. http://www.oie.int/doc/ged/D1328.PDF.  
2002: 11 cases were confirmed in Fentale – in the East Shewa area of Oromiya.  The anthrax cases were 
discovered in two of the 18 peasant associations that make up Fentale. The two peasant associations where the 




No recent information available on PubMed. 
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2015: Outbreak at Lake Nakuru National Park reached over 300 dead buffaloes. Other animals affected included 
rhinos, giraffes, elands, impalas, warthogs and Thomson gazelles. http://outbreaknewstoday.com/kenya-
anthrax-update-300-buffaloes-dead-at-lake-nakuru-national-park-58005/ 
2012: 100 animals were killed in outbreaks in Turkana. 
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000066907/anthrax-outbreak-kills-100-animals-in-turkana 
2011: 11 giraffes were found dead in a 3 month period at the Mwea National Reserve. 
https://www.dovepress.com/an-outbreak-of-anthrax-in-endangered-rothschildrsquos-giraffes-in-mwea-peer-
reviewed-article-VMRR 




No recent information available on PubMed or the internet (English and/or French).  
 
Malawi 
No recent information available on PubMed or the internet.  
 
Mali 
No recent information available on PubMed or the internet (English and/or French).  
 
Mozambique 
No recent information available on PubMed or the internet (English and/or Portuguese).  
 
Rwanda 
No recent information available on PubMed or the internet (English and/or French).  
 
Senegal 
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No relevant data on PubMed 
There are references on internet about the government supporting vaccination campaigns for anthrax in 
different years, but no data on outbreaks or prevalence.  
 
South Africa 
Anthrax is endemic in parts of southern Africa and is commonly reported in livestock and wildlife. 
2014: Northern Cape Province - During March 2014 there were reports of an unusual increase in deaths among 
sheep and goats in Sanddrift (Namakwa District), close to the Namibian border and anthrax was confirmed.  The 
last recorded animal anthrax outbreak in this area was in 2006, and occurred in Kuboes, a small town 
neighbouring Sanddrift. One human case of probable cutaneous anthrax was identified, and 19 persons exposed 
to anthrax-contaminated goat and sheep carcasses were given antibiotic prophylaxis and monitored. 
http://www.nicd.ac.za/assets/files/NICD-NHLS%20AnthraX.pdf  
2014: Northern Kruger National Park, Limpopo Province - An outbreak of anthrax among wildlife was reported in 
the northern Pafuri area of the Kruger National Park. Although this area is known to be endemic for anthrax with 
wildlife cases reported every year, there was a sudden dramatic increase in the number of anthrax cases during 




Anthrax is widespread in Tanzania, affecting livestock and wildlife.  
2014: Anthrax was detected in hippopotamuses, soil and humans. 
http://www.ojvr.org/index.php/ojvr/article/viewFile/722/1000  
2013: Reports of anthrax from several districts of Arusha and Kilimanjarao regions, linked to livestock. 
http://promedmail.chip.org/pipermail/promed-eafr/2013-July/001349.html  
Outbreak in Moshi – Kilimanjaro.  10 cases associated to 1 dead cow. 
http://aslm.org/aslm2012/images/docs/Friday-December-7th-2012/Oral-Posters/Role-of-Laboratory-in-
Outbreak-Investigations/2.%20Mura%20Ngoi.pdf  
There is an interesting thesis about the suitability of the anthrax vaccine for cattle, sheep and goats distributed 
by CVL, Dar es Salaam, but unfortunately, a full copy of the thesis is not available. 
http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/231225  
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Sporadic anthrax outbreaks have occurred in and around Uganda's Queen Elizabeth National Park (QENP) for 
years, affecting wildlife, domestic animals, and humans.  
Recently there have been several outbreaks among wildlife in Uganda's Queen Elizabeth National Park (QENP). 
The 2004-2005 QENP outbreak killed over 450 animals: 306 hippopotami representing 11.63%, 63 zebras 
representing 1.47%, 60 buffaloes representing 0.9%, thirteen warthogs representing 0.69%, twelve kobs 
representing 0.07%, three waterbucks representing 0.09% and five elephants representing 0.02% died (Wafula, 
2008 http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1365-2028.2007.00796.x/abstract). Such a cycle of disease 
recurrence results in higher infection risk among towns and villages near the park. 
Most recently, there was an outbreak in 2011 in Sheema District (more than 50 km from the park) and involved 
no wild animals. This outbreak temporarily shut down meat, dairy, and livestock markets and claimed the lives 
of two humans and nine livestock [24]. 
 
Zambia 
It has been demonstrated highly pathogenic B. cereus is present in Zambia. Cases of anthrax-suspected deaths in 
wildlife have been reported every year in Lower Zambezi National Park; B. cereus was implicated as the cause in 
at least some of these cases. Zambia may be a high-risk country for highly pathogenic B. cereus infection 
outbreaks [25].  
August 2011: an anthrax outbreak occurred among Hippopotamus amphibius hippopotamuses in the Chama 
district of the eastern province of Zambia. Over 80 hippopotamuses died after showing signs of infection with B. 
anthracis. Following the deaths of the hippopotamuses, 521 suspected human cases resulting in 6 deaths were 
reported [26]. 
Nov 2010: An anthrax outbreak occurred in five villages of Sesheke district in Western Zambia. The average herd 
size of infected cattle in affected villages was estimated at 121.8 (95% CI 48.8-194.8). Individual mortality per 
herd varied between 1.70% (3/179) and 20.25% (6/79). In humans, the disease only affected three people and 
was characterized by cutaneous carbuncles. The ratio of infected persons per number of infected carcasses 
varied between 1:37 and 1:49 in affected villages while the overall ratio of people at risk to the number of 
carcasses was 42:1 indicating that despite availability of a large number of carcasses, human contact with 
infected carcasses was low [27].   
1999 – 2007: Anthrax is endemic throughout the upper Zambezi floodplain (Western Province). Retrospective 
data for the period 1999 to 2007 showed that a total of 1,216 bovine cases of anthrax were reported. During the 
same period, 1,790 human anthrax cases and a corresponding case fatality rate of 4.63% (83/1,790) was 
documented in the upper Zambezi floodplain. Occurrence of human cases was highly correlated with cattle 
outbreaks (r = 0.94, p < 0.001) [28]. 
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1989-1995: Anthrax is endemic in Western and North-western Provinces of Zambia. The disease occurs 
throughout the year and impacts negatively on the economy of the livestock industry and public health 
in Zambia. During 1989-1995, there were 1626 suspected cases of anthrax in cattle in Western province and of 
these 51 were confirmed. There were 220 cases of human anthrax cases in 1990 alone and 248 cases during 
1991-1998 with 19.1% and 7.7% case fatality rates, respectively [29].  
 
3- Human data in Africa: 
Data reported by Dr Sodjinou (WHO) on the human anthrax situation in Africa during the Regional meeting on 
Anthrax in West Africa, organized by FAO (with the collaboration of AU-IBAR, CDC, OIE and EUMOA) in Togo in 
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Figure 5: Epidemiological situation of human anthrax in Africa. (Source: Dr Sodjnou, Togo 2015) 
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Prevalence data by country (from 2000 onwards) 
Due to the nature of the disease (peracute and acute manifestations, with very high mortality as actually the 
disease needs to kill the animals so it can propagate, and its manifestation as sporadic cases in endemic regions), 
it is very difficult if not impossible to measure prevalence.  An indirect way to measure prevalence in animals 
would be to measure prevalence in humans, but again, the disease is very much underreported, so it is very 
difficult to estimate.  
The research done showed very little information for each of the countries of interest. Sources used were 
PubMed and internet engine searches in English (and French for fievre charbonneuse when applicable).  
Real prevalence data was only found for Bangladesh, Tanzania and Zambia.  For all the other countries, the 




Prevalence information for Bangladesh is shown in Table 6.  
Table 6: Estimated number of diagnosed cases, prevalence, death cases and vaccination coverage of 






Source: Hampson et al, 2011 [30]. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22318563  
In a study done in the Serengeti ecosystem, seroprevalence was consistently high in carnivores (90% and 57% 
overall seropositivity in Serengeti and Ngorongoro Crater lions respectively, and 87% seropositivity in Serengeti 
spotted hyenas) and significantly lower among herbivores (46% and 14% seropositivity in Serengeti and 
Ngorongoro Crater buffalo, 19% and 4% in Serengeti and Ngorongoro Crater wildebeest), with no seropositive 
zebras. Overall seroprevalence was lower in Ngorongoro Crater wildlife populations than in Serengeti.  
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Human anthrax case reports were sporadic and originated exclusively from pastoralist villages in the NCA and 




Source: Munang’andu et al, 2012 [27] http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22885011  
In an anthrax outbreak in five villages of Sesheke district in Western Zambia, the prevalence of the disease in 
cattle was estimated at 7.4% (45/609) while the average herd size of infected cattle in affected villages was 
estimated at 121.8 (95% CI 48.8-194.8). In humans, the disease only affected three people and was 
characterized by cutaneous carbuncles.
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Economic and Social Impacts at Global 







The economic and social impacts of anthrax are due to the human, livestock and wildlife disease.  The disease 
itself and the standard control methods have serious economic, biosecurity, and conservation implications. It is 
important to note that anthrax can considerably affect wildlife.  
 
Humans  
Anthrax is an important zoonoses, and the WHO estimates that between 20,000 and 100,000 human cases occur 
globally per year.   
B. anthracis has always been high on the list of potential agents with respect to biological warfare and 
bioterrorism. It has been used in that context on at least 2 occasions, and been the named agent in many threats 
and hoaxes.  The information available regarding the impact of anthrax in humans, is focused on the impact of 
anthrax as a bioterrorist threat.  In 1997, Kaufmann et al [31], constructed a model that compared the impact of 
three classic agents of biologic warfare (Bacillus anthracis, Brucella melitensis, and Francisella tularensis) when 
released as aerosols in the suburb of a major city. The model showed that the economic impact of a bioterrorist 
attack can range from an estimated $477.7 million per 100,000 persons exposed (brucellosis scenario) to $26.2 
billion per 100,000 persons exposed (anthrax scenario). Rapid implementation of a post-attack prophylaxis 
program was identified as the single most important means of reducing these losses.  
The economic impacts of a wide area release of Anthrax was also evaluated by the US Department of Homeland 
Security in 2009 (http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-18448.pdf). The 
different cost categories included are seen in Figure 6, and were:    
• Loss of Life includes costs associated with compensation for lost earnings, which may be paid by insurance 
policies, the government, businesses, or charities; or the costs may be absorbed by individual families. There 
may also be costs associated with lost productivity from loss of life as organizations are forced to operate 
without essential staff. A potential cost could come in the form of liability for loss of life if building owners 
were thought to have provided inadequate protection.  
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• Healthcare refers to costs associated with diagnosis and treatment of the sick or injured and responding to 
the worried well.  
• Damage and Loss of Property refers to costs associated with damaged property and lost assets that require 
replacement.  Other costs may include insurance losses on property. For the federal government, there may 
also be costs associated with allocation of grant funding to state and local agencies and other critical 
responders. 
• Evacuation and Return costs are those associated with physically moving citizens and businesses away from 
the contaminated and possibly surrounding area, either voluntarily or through planned evacuation. There 
will be costs for government to keep people out of unsafe areas as well. And when it is time to repopulate 
the evacuated areas, there may be costs to support the return to homes and businesses. Finally, there may 
be costs associated with temporarily relocating people and businesses and incentivising them to return to 
their buildings.  
• Decontamination or Decommissioning refers to the broad set of costs associated with cleaning up buildings, 
homes, and critical infrastructure that might have been contaminated in the attack. It may also be 
determined that an area/building is not a good candidate for decontamination due to economic, legal, or 
other factors, and may be decommissioned instead. Examples of decontamination costs include sampling 
and testing, remediation labour, supplies and equipment costs, and waste disposal. There could also be 
costs resulting from liability for exposure during clean-up or for inadequate clean-up. 
• Other Indirect Economic Losses captures other means through which value could be lost to government and 
the private sector as a result of the disruption to the economy. The loss of income will have a major impact 
on all stakeholder groups, and could ultimately cause defaulting on loans or tightened access to credit. The 
government’s main source of income is tax revenue, which will be affected when its residential and 
commercial population evacuates or is impaired. Businesses earn revenue from commerce; beyond the 
direct loss of commerce from businesses forced to close or relocate, factors such as loss of consumer 
confidence will have a negative effect on businesses throughout the regional economy. Finally, rising civil 
unrest as a result of increasing social stratification, a growth in potential hate crimes and discrimination may 
result in other costs to property owners and society as a whole. 
 
Livestock  
The mortality rate for anthrax varies with the species. Clinical infections in ruminants and horses are usually 
fatal; pigs often recover.   
With the development of the Sterne spore vaccine, a sharp decline in anthrax outbreaks in livestock occurred 
during the 1930-1980 era.  However, a resurgence of this disease in livestock has been reported in some regions, 
where complacency, a false sense of security or other causes have hindered vaccination. 
The main losses in case of an outbreak would be from mortalities, which can be high, and losses due to an 
inability to trade while quarantine restrictions are in place. There would be an increased cost from vaccinating 
the animals.  There is also a considerable impact on the producer due to resources and significant effort 
required for disposal of affected carcases (burnt in-situ) and site decontamination. 
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At national level, for countries with sporadic cases, it is unlikely that outbreaks would continue for more than 2 
months from the start to the lifting of the restrictions, and the likelihood of there being long-term economic 




Figure 6: General Framework for analysis of economic impact of a wide area release of Anthrax (Source: 
Judd et al, 2009 – Economic impacts of a wide area release of anthrax). 
 
Analysis by the World Bank 
The World Livestock Disease Atlas – a quantitative analysis of global animal health data [32], published  by the 
World Bank (with cooperation of OIE and FAO) in 2011 is an attempt to understand which livestock diseases 
cause the heaviest losses, which countries suffers the worst disease-related losses and which livestock species 




The World Livestock Disease Atlas bases its analysis on the Livestock Units (LSU).  Each species has a LSU value, 
and the losses of LSU have been given a value.  See Figure 7. For more information on the methodology 
description, please refer to the World Bank Atlas itself (pages 6 & 7). Anthrax is one of the top 10 diseases 
causing losses for cattle, buffalos and small ruminants, as shown in Figure 8. However, looking at the data in 
detail, there are few data from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.  
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Figure 8: Top 10 diseases in terms of LSU losses for cattle, buffalo, and sheep & goats. Source: World 
Livestock Disease Atlas – The World Bank, 2011 [32]. 
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Major epidemics of anthrax periodically flare up in African wildlife conservation areas such as the Queen 
Elizabeth National Park in Uganda, the Omo-Mago National Park in Ethiopia, the Selous Nature Reserve in 
Tanania, the Luangwa Valley in Zambia, the Etosha National Park in Namibia, the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park in 
South Africa and Botswana, and the Vaalbos and Kruger National Parks in South Africa [33]. In the Kruger National 
Park, a symbiotic relationship between anthrax and the complex of ecosystems exist.  Outbreaks in National 
parks, can present a persistent risk to surrounding livestock, as well as a public health. 
In multi-species African conservation areas, carcass counts and analyses demonstrate that certain herbivores are 
over or under represented in relation to their population numbers and densities, indicating varying degrees of 
susceptibility and or behavioral vulnerability to infection. In general, the spiral horned antelope, and buffalo are 
over-represented, while the Acelpahines, zebra and impala are under-represented.   
However, the impact of the disease can be considerable. As an example, in 2004, an outbreak in Malilangwe 
Wildlife Reserve in Zimbabwe killed almost all of the approximately 500 kudu in the reserve, as well as large 
numbers of other wild ruminants. Other species badly affected were nyala, bushbuck, waterbuck and roan 
antelope, which suffered losses of approximately 68%, 48% 44% and 42% of their populations respectively.  
Buffalo were also badly affected, and although their populations suffered only 6% losses, the number of deaths 
ranked second highest after kudu [34]. 
In many natural parks in Africa, anthrax is considered indigenous and an integral part of the ecosystem. The 
policy is to institute active control measures only if it affects biodiversity or a human intervention is providing 
impetus to the disease.  Some animals like cheetah and black rhinoceros are endangered species, so they qualify 
for direct control measures such as vaccination.  At Etosha National Park (Namibia), black rhinoceros have been 
vaccinated since the 1970s [35].  
 
Impact on specific focus countries 
There are no published reports about the detailed specific economic and social impact of anthrax in the 
countries of interest. However, some publications have mentioned its impact: 
Bangladesh 
A human outbreak occurred from April to September 2011, affected mostly the two North-Western districts of 
Sirajganj (61 cases) and Pabna (32 cases). Additionally, the districts of Bogra, Meherpur and Tangail had 28, 39 
and 14 cases of anthrax respectively. Due to vaccine coverage in the preceding years, the number of livestock 
deaths was minimal and only a few infected slaughtered animals wer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
e held responsible for human transmission during the outbreak. Fortunately there were no anthrax-related 
human deaths but meat sales drastically declined due to a lack of consumer confidence, and anthrax created 
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mass havoc with significant economic losses related to cattle farming. Although there was no known case 
fatality, people panicked and mass immunization of livestock was demanded by concerned sections [15].  
 
Uganda 
An outbreak in 2011 in Sheema District temporarily shut down meat, dairy, and livestock markets and claimed 
the lives of two humans and nine livestock [24]. 
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Anthrax is an internationally reportable disease. Being a notifiable disease by law in most countries, anthrax 
control procedures are usually prescribed and enforced by government veterinary services.  
Anthrax control measures are aimed at breaking the cycle of infection and consist basically of a surveillance 
system, prophylactic procedures (immunization, treatment and disinfection), and disease regulatory actions 
(quarantine, proper disposal of carcasses, decontamination of the site and disinfection of the items used to test 
and dispose of the carcasses, treatment and immunization).  If a potential infectious source is known to exist, it 




Bacillus anthracis is susceptible to most antibiotics; however, because of the peracute nature of anthrax disease 
in herbivores, by the time the animal shows clinical signs it is usually too late to treat with antibiotics. During a 
herd outbreak in cattle, it may be useful to treat any sick or febrile animals as well as any suspect incubating 
cases with long-acting penicillin or tetracyclines. The WHO/OIE/FAO recommends the use of penicillin with 
streptomycin. Anthrax has a less acute course in carnivores, and during outbreaks in southern Africa, lions and 
leopards with typical clinical signs (swollen faces and lips) have been successfully treated with large doses of 
long-acting penicillin [1].  However, a few countries, do not permit antibiotic treatment, requiring slaughter with 
appropriate disposal instead.  
Recommendations from AU-IBAR: (http://www.au-ibar.org/anthrax) 
The first sign of anthrax in a herd is unexpected death of one or more animals. Following this first incident of 
anthrax in a herd, the remaining animals should be moved immediately from the site where the index case(s) 
died. Animals should be checked at least three times daily for 2-weeks for signs of illness (rapid breathing, 
elevated body temperature) or of submandibular or other oedema. Any animal showing these signs should be 
separated from the herd and treated with antibiotics immediately. Intravenous sodium benzylpenicillin 
according to manufacturer's instructions, usually in the range 12,000-22,000 units per kg of body weight. This 
should be followed 6-8 hours later by intramuscular injection of long acting benethamine penicillin for which 
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manufacturers' instructions usually recommend dose within range 6000-12,000 units per kg of body weight. 
Alternatively, another appropriate long-acting preparation such as Clamoxyl® (15 mg/kg), a long-acting 
preparation of amoxycillin can be administered and are normally successful. If long-acting preparations are 
unavailable, procaine penicillin (dose recommended by manufacturers is usually 6000-12,000 units/kg) can be 
used for intramuscular injection but should be administered again after 24 and 48 hours. Streptomycin acts 
synergistically with penicillin and penicillin/streptomycin mixtures are available commercially but involve an 
extra cost. Recommended doses of streptomycin to be administered together with penicillin intramuscularly are 
5-10 mg per kg body weight in large animals and 25-100 mg per kg body weight in small animals. 
If there is concern that the antibiotic treatment will not control the outbreak, the herd should be vaccinated.  
Live spores constitute the active ingredient of the vaccine and therefore treatment should not be done 
simultaneously with vaccination. Deaths usually cease within 8 to 14 days of vaccination. Herd quarantine can be 
lifted 21 days after the last death. Decontamination of the site(s) where the index case or other case(s) died 
should be carried out.  




Prophylactic treatment may also be indicated prior to moving animals out of an outbreak zone. These animals 
can then be vaccinated at their destination a minimum of 14 days after the date of the antibiotic treatment. 
 
Options and strategies for control programs at national, sub-national or regional level 
Control measures for anthrax are aimed at breaking the cycle of infection and involve four main components: 
1. Discontinuation of infection source and site quarantine: 
In outbreaks having a defined source, discontinuing this source is an essential first step. If the infection can 
be traced to feeding for example, the feed source should be immediately withdrawn from the index farm 
and from all others that received it. Moving other animals from the affected area is an important early 
action.  If flies are suspected of being important vectors, fly control should be considered. A contingency 
plan for the prevention and control for anthrax is included as Appendix VI in the WHO anthrax guidelines 
(WHO, 2008). It recommends that affected premises should be quarantined for at least 20 days (OIE 
incubation period) after the last case. Any susceptible livestock, or risky items (carcasses, hides, skins, etc.) 
moved from the premise should be traced and the appropriate action taken.  
2. Correct disposal of carcasses of animals that have died of anthrax:  
The carcasses should not be opened, and they should be incinerated, rendered or buried.  The preferred 
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method of carcass disposal is in situ incineration by a method that ensures thorough scorching of the 
contaminated ground in the vicinity of the carcass. Practical details are given in Appendix III of the WHO 
anthrax guidelines (WHO, 2008). Where lack of fuel prevents this, burial 1.5 to 2 m below ground may be the 
only option. Burial is not ideal, as it is labour intense and requires a mix of chloride and lime in the soil.  
Numerous reports exist, however, of fresh outbreaks occurring after disturbance of known or suspected 
anthrax burial sites, and burial should always be discouraged in favour of incineration where possible. Some 
countries spray 5% formaldehyde on and around the carcass to deter scavengers. Where local regulations 
permit it, transfer of a carcass to a body bag and transport to a permanent incinerator may be considered. 
Care must be taken to avoid spreading contamination while manipulating the carcass. 
3. Decontamination by appropriate methods of the sites where the animals died and of any materials 
subsequently contaminated: 
Appropriate decontamination methods include dry heat, autoclaving, incineration, fumigation with 
sporicidal fumigants (formaldehyde, ethylene oxide), disinfection with sporicidal disinfectants (hypochlorite, 
formalin, glutaraldehyde, hydrogen peroxide, peracetic acid) or irradiation. It has been suggested that dry 
heat at 160°C for one hour or irradiation at ±20 kGy is sufficient depending on the degree of contamination 
and the bulk of the material. Different procedures and, where relevant, chemicals will be appropriate for 
different materials and circumstances. Hypochlorites are not suitable for metal objects or materials with a 
high organic content. Formalin is often the best and easiest sporicidal disinfectant to apply but is hazardous 
to operators and animals. Soil can be incinerated, but whether this is practical depends on the quantity of 
contaminated soil present. Where contaminated sites are too large to practically decontaminate, the only 
approach may be to isolate them, for example by concreting them over.  
4. Vaccination where there is risk of the outbreak spreading: 
Livestock vaccines in almost all countries are suspensions of spores of an attenuated strain of B. anthracis 
usually with saponin as an adjuvant.  See Section 6 for more details on vaccines used.  
 
In countries with well-established veterinary services and public health monitoring, anthrax outbreaks are 
rapidly contained by the imposition of standard control measures. EU standards are the establishment of a 3 km 
radius of protection (vaccination) after an outbreak, and 10 km radius surveillance.  
In countries in which the disease is not well controlled, regular outbreaks of anthrax can become serious 
epidemics of both animals and humans.  For example, when civil war interrupted normal vaccination and 
regulatory controls in Zimbabwe in the late 1970s, a massive outbreak in 1978 resulted in more than 10,000 
human cases and untold number of deaths in cattle. 
In some countries like South Africa, there are laws for compulsory annual vaccination (Animal Diseases Act 
No.35 of 1984 which aims at the establishment of an immune population through the compulsory annual 
vaccination of all cattle).  In the past, government veterinary authorities shouldered the responsibility of 
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vaccination and achieved considerable success.  However, when responsibility shifted to the farmer, there was a 
sharp decline in number of animals vaccinated annually.   
 
Control of anthrax in wildlife 
In the major game reserves, such as the Kruger National Park, most of the control measures, as used for 
livestock, are difficult, if not impossible, to apply and/or enforce. In addition, anthrax, being considered 
indigenous in a natural and integral part of the ecosystems of some of these areas, makes it debatable whether 
active control measures should actually be instituted. In the national parks of South Africa, the policy is to 
institute active control measures against anthrax only if it affects biodiversity negatively (e.g. by threatening the 
survival of low density or threatened species), and/or where the actions of humans (such as fencing or the 
provision of artificial watering points), are providing unnatural impetus to an outbreak.  As a general rule of 
thumb, the bigger and more natural and self-sufficient an area is, the less control measures should be 
implemented.  
Vaccinating wild animals can be very difficult, being by massive capture and use of a chute, or by using ground 
vehicles, hides or helicopter platforms. This last form requires remote injection by means of “drop-out” darts or 
biodegradable ballistic implant projectiles.  The need to repeat vaccination annually is daunting.   There is a 
definite need for the development of an effective oral vaccine for ranched and habituated wildlife, which can be 
delivered by water or feed.  
Apart from vaccination, anthrax control procedures in wildlife include the fencing-off or burning of known 
anthrax contaminated vegetation, the location and covering and/or incineration of carcasses as soon as possible 
so as to prevent their dismemberment by scavengers, and the replacement of natural waterholes by concrete 
drinking troughs in which the water can be disinfected or it can be drained.  
 
Disease situation and government policies by country 
Tables 7 and 8 below have been completed with the information received from the questionnaires sent to the 
DG and DVS.  For a list of respondents, please see Annex 3.   
Table 7 covers the disease situation (if it is notifiable or not), the presence of official surveillance and/or control 
programs, and the treatment situation.  Table 8 refers to vaccination. 
The definitions that were given to the respondents are: 
1Surveillance: is the systematic ongoing collection, collation and analysis of data and the timely dissemination 
of information to those who need to know so that action can be taken.  
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2Control: a program which is approved, and managed or supervised by the Veterinary Authority of a country for 
the purpose of controlling a vector, pathogen or disease by specific measures applied throughout that country, 
or within a zone or compartment of that country. 
 
Table 7: Official status, official programs and treatment for anthrax in the countries of interest.  





















Bangladesh Yes Yes, passive No Yes Yes 
India      
Indonesia      
Myanmar (Burma) Yes Yes, passive Yes No Yes 
Nepal Yes Yes, passive No No No 
Vietnam Yes Yes, passive No No Yes 
AFRICA 
Burkina Faso      
Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory 
Coast) 
Yes Passive, but active 
when there is an 
outbreak 
Yes No  
Ethiopia      
Kenya Yes Yes, active and 
passive 
No Yes No 
Madagascar      
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Malawi Yes No No No No 
Mali Yes Yes, passive Yes No No 
Mozambique      
Rwanda  Yes Yes, active and 
passive 
Yes Yes No 
Senegal      
South Africa      
Tanzania  Yes Yes, passive No Yes No 
Uganda Yes No No Yes No 
Zambia Yes Yes, passive Yes Yes No 
 
 
Table 8:  Vaccination for Anthrax in the countries of interest.  
















Species vaccinated (cattle, 
sheep, goats, pigs, poultry) 
ASIA 
Bangladesh No Combination 
(Government 
subsidy, owner pays 
service charge) 
Official Cattle, buffalo. To some 
extent, goat and sheep 
India     
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Indonesia     
Myanmar (Burma) Yes Government Official Cattle 
Nepal No N/A N/A N/A 
Vietnam No Farmers Both Cattle 
AFRICA 
Burkina Faso     
Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory 
Coast)  
No Government in case 
of outbreaks. If not, 
farmers.  
Official Cattle, sheep and goats 
Ethiopia     
Kenya No Farmers Both Cattle, sheep, goats 
Madagascar     
Malawi No N/A N/A N/A 
Mali No Combination Official Cattle, sheep & goats 
Mozambique     
Rwanda Yes Farmers Official Cattle 
Senegal     
South Africa     
Tanzania  No Farmers Both Cattle, sheep & goats 
Uganda No Government & 
farmers 
Both (government & 
private) 
Cattle 
Zambia No Farmers Both Cattle 
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It has been noticed than in 2014, UEMOA (the West African Economic and Monetary Union) supported an 
anthrax control effort in West Africa. It included Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger and 
Togo (Senegal to start in 2016).  In Ivory Coast, 36 vaccinators were mobilized, and they vaccinated a total of 
363,711 animals including cattle, sheep and goats between Nov 2013 and January 2014.  Source: Dr Domagni 
presentation during the Regional meeting on Anthrax in West Africa, organized by FAO (with the collaboration of 
AU-IBAR, CDC, OIE and EUMOA) in Togo in Sept 2015 (presentations are not available on line, but were obtained 
from Dr Bedane from FAO).   
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Current vaccine types 
Pasteur demonstrated protection against anthrax by immunisation in 1881 using a heat attenuated strain. 
However, problems with declining potency and variations in virulence led to the search for a more effective and 
stable vaccine. There were 2 types of Pasteur vaccine, type 1 and type 2. The Pasteur type 1 strain was used until 
relatively recently in Italy to vaccinate goats and horses.   
Most anthrax vaccines in use in the world at present, utilize the toxigenic, non-capsulating B. anthracis 34F2 
isolated in 1937 by Max Sterne at Ondesterpoort in South Africa, from a subculture from a case of bovine 
anthrax. This variant has lost the pX02 plasmid which codes for capsule formation (pX01+, pX02-).  It is used 
essentially as originally formulated with approximately 107 spores/ml suspended in 1.5% saponin in 50% 
glycerol-saline. Some laboratories use aluminium hydroxide gel instead. In the past, this strain has also been 
wrongly called “Weybridge” strain.  The basis of protection is the development of antibodies to the Protective 
Antigen.  
There are also other livestock vaccines used in specific countries or regions.  The anthrax strain 1190R was 
developed in Romania, more or less at the same time than the Sterne strain, and it is still being used locally. The 
anthrax strain 55 is used mainly in Russia, Central and Eastern Europe.  Both strains are very similar to the Sterne 
stain (pX01+, pX02-).  Italy has also been using the Carbosap vaccine, produced from a pX01+, pX02+ strain. 
The OIE manual mentions only the Sterne 34F2 and the strain 55 vaccines.  The OIE recommends a minimum 2-
10 x106 culturable spores per dose for cattle, buffaloes and horses, and no less than 1-5x106 culturable spores 
per dose for sheep, goats and pigs.  However, protection tends to be less than 100% in animals if they have only 
received one dose, and the dose was less than 107 spores. Recommended doses may vary by country and 
manufacturer.  For example, in Australia the only registered anthrax vaccine delivers the following minimum 
doses: Cattle: 4 million viable spores, Sheep and goats: 2 million viable spores; in the United States the dose is 2 
million viable spores per doses [36]. 
Sterne 34F2 vaccine 
The live spore Sterne vaccines is, for all practical purposes, non-pathogenic in most domestic and wild animal 
species.  It causes few adverse reactions in cattle and sheep (they might have an elevated temperature 12-36 
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hours after vaccination, causing reduced milk yield). However, it appears to retain a degree of virulence for 
certain species, and severe reactions can occur in goats and llamas.  In such species, 2 inoculations one month 
apart, with the first one being one quarter of the standard dose and the second a full standard dose, are 
recommended (not all manufacturers recommend this).  Llamas are often mentioned together with goats, but 
the evidence is limited to one single publication in 1987. It is possible that the reaction in goats is due to the 
quality of the saponin component, as it is known that goats react to certain saponins (Dungu, personal 
communication). Deaths associated with anthrax vaccine, have been reported recently in miniature horses in 
Canada [37].  
In horses, being slow to develop immunity (one month or more) 2 standard doses, one month apart and a single 
annual booster is recommended. Two initial doses approx. 8 weeks apart have been found necessary to develop 
dependably measurably antibody titres in zebra.  It the other species, a single vaccination is usually effective for 
6-12 months, provided that animals receive the full dose and because the active ingredient is live spores, the 
animals are not under antibiotic treatment within 10-14 days before or after vaccination. In heavily 
contaminated areas, two vaccinations, 2-3 weeks apart are recommended. Annual revaccination is generally 
considered to be adequate to ensure permanent protection in most situations.  Effective immunity generally 
develops within a week of vaccination, although as already mentioned, in horses it may take a month or more.  
There are many manufacturers of the Sterne 34F2 vaccine worldwide.  The most common adjuvant is Saponin, 
but aluminium hydroxide is also used.  Some manufacturers also include glycerine.   
 
Vaccine production issues 
Uncapsulated B. anthracis variants may lose their immunogenicity on subculture.  It is therefore important that 
standardized procedures for the manufacturing of anthrax vaccines be used.  There are also considerable 
differences in vaccine quality and it might be partially due to the quality of the glycerine and saponin used. 
Issues relating to vaccine quality have been reported (as an example, comments on the quality of the vaccine 
manufactured in Tanzania have been included in a PhD thesis from Pilot M.A in 2012 called “The suitability of 
the anthrax vaccine for cattle, sheep and goats distributed by CVL, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania”, but unfortunately 
the full text is not available even by request. The abstract can be seen at: 
http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/231225).  
The Sterne strain loses the ability to produce integral toxins. They have subsequently recovered intact toxin-
producing bacteria by infecting mice and re-isolated the bacterium from brain. In this way they were able to 
revitalize the Sterne strain. 
Vaccine failures may occur as a result of poor quality or low potency vaccine, animals not receiving the correct 
dose, animals receiving such a high infective dose that the body’s immune system in overpowered, animals 
being under antibiotic effects, or an as yet unexplained poor immunogenic reaction of individuals. As for 
potential vaccine failure related to the local lineages, please see B. anthracis lineages in Page 7.  
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Pasteur strains  
The attenuation of the Pasteur vaccines is mainly due to the loss of the plasmid pXO1. These vaccines were 
obtained from Pasteur cultivating pathogenic strains of Bacillus anthracis at a temperature of 42°C. This 
treatment had caused the disappearance in the pathogenic strain of the plasmid pXO1 and consequently of all 
the toxic factors encoded in it. The absence of pXO1 justifies the attenuation of the strain, since there is no 
production of EF, LF and PA, but also raises serious questions about the real protective capabilities of these 
vaccines for the failure to produce even the PA. 
There are two types of Pasteur vaccines.  Type 1 is pathogenic for mice and apathogenic for the guinea pig; they 
are obtained by growing the bacterium at temperatures of 42° - 43°C for 15-20 days; Type 2 is pathogenic for 
mice and guinea pig and apathogenic for the rabbit; they are obtained by growing the bacterium at 
temperatures of 42° - 43°C for only 10-12 days.   
The Pasteur Type 1 vaccine was used in Italy until 2006, and it was produced by the Istituto Zooprofilattico 
Sperimentale della Puglia e della Basilicata (IZS PB).  The Pasteur Type 2 is only used in China.  
 
Italy: Carbosap 
The strain was obtained in the laboratories of the “Istituto Vaccinogeno di Asmara” during the Second World 
War, by the research group led by Prof. Cilli. Introduced in Italy by Prof. Boat it was used between 1949 and 
2006 in the campaigns of vaccination against anthrax and has been of great contribution in the fight for the 
eradication of anthrax in Italy. The vaccine strain Carbosap possessed both plasmids, pXO1 and pXO2, and had 
the capsule and was able to produce all three toxins. The presence of all plasmids revealed its similarity with 
three other atypical Pasteur vaccine strains (# 1, # 2-H, n.2-17JB). So, it would be possible to assume the 
existence of a third group of anthrax vaccines made from strains of Bacillus anthracis pXO1+/pXO2+.  The 
feature that most distinguishes it from other vaccine strains is that despite a pattern plasmid identical to that of 
a pathogenic strain, it shows a residual pathogenicity that is really very low. The vaccine Carbosap was used in 
vaccination of cattle and sheep, although tests have shown the effectiveness of protection even in the case of 
caprine and in the equine.  Efficacy trials of the vaccine have highlighted the high protective power which tends 
to set in after just one vaccination intervention. This particular property makes it very useful in common practice 
because its use is more advantageous compared to the Sterne which requires, on the contrary, two doses. 




Romania: Strain 1190R - Stamatin 
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This strain was developed by Nicolae Statmatin in 1937-38 at the Institute Pasteur in Bucharest.  It is a non-
capsulated strain (pX01+, pX02-). Details can be seen in Table 9. Information was mainly obtained from the 2 
manufacturers that were identified: 
Institute Pasteur Romania: http://www.pasteur.ro/produse/antravac/ 
Romvac: http://www.romvac.ro/Blog%20Posts/carboromvac-2.html 
Please note that some information might have been “lost in translation”.  
 
Russia and Eastern/Central Europe:  Strain 55-VNIIVViM and others 
Strain 55 was developed by The National Research Institute for Veterinary Virology and Microbiology of Russia 
(VNIIVViM).  Information about this vaccine can be seen in Table 9.  The details have been obtained from 
internet searches, and pages containing information from what would look like official documents, and some 






It seems that in order to overcome some of the issues of the strain 55, a new strain has been developed, the 
strain 363/11, obtained from an affected gilt.  This is also a pX01+, pX02- strain.  It looks like it has been 
patented in Russia:  http://russianpatents.com/patent/254/2544951.html  
There is also a patent for a combined vaccine against anthrax based on the binary combination of live spores 
vaccine strain STI-1 and protective antigen, obtained from microbial culture vaccine strain 55 VNIIVViM in order 
to create long-lasting immunity. http://russianpatents.com/patent/222/2220742.html.  
Please note that some information might not be correct, due to the use of Google translate as the majority of 
the information is in Russian.  
 
China 
In China there are currently 3 vaccines.  The Sterne vaccine, the Pasteur Type 2, and a PA oil emulsion vaccine 
(Sterne culture filtrate mixed with oil adjuvant) which was originally developed for goats.  
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There are some references about a live anthrax vaccine called K79-Z used in Ukraine, but information is very 
limited: http://referatu.net.ua/referats/7569/148507. It seems that the vaccine was developed at the Institute 
of Veterinary Medicine, National Academy of Agrarian Sciences of Ukraine:  
http://ivm.kiev.ua/en/structure/scientific-departments/department-of-especially-dangerous-
diseases/laboratory-of-anthrax-study.html.  They also developed an experimental abacillar vaccine for anthrax 
called “Antrakol”, in which the main component is exotoxin (obtained from B. anthracis strain K-79Z), which was 
successfully tested in experimental farms and has high performance:  





There are mainly 4 human vaccines. The ones produced in China, Russia, UK and USA.   
UK and USA 
In the UK and USA, human vaccines developed in the 1950s and 1960s respectively, are produced principally for 
military use. The UK vaccine is an alum-precipitated cell-free culture filtrate of the Sterne strain and it is called 
Anthrax Vaccine Precipitated (AVP). It was first introduced for works in at risk occupations in 1965, and licensed 
for human use in 1979 [38]. The vaccination plan is based on 3 primary doses of 0.5 ml IM at 3 week intervals, 
with booster at 32 weeks and thereafter annually. In the USA the vaccine is an aluminium hydroxide adsorbed 
cell-free culture filtrate of a non-capsulating, non-proteolytic derivative of bovine isolate V770 grown 
anaerobically in a fermenter, and is called Anthrax Vaccine Absorbed (AVA).  The vaccination regime is 3 SC 
doses of 0.5 ml each, 2 weeks apart, followed by 3 additional SC injections at 6, 12 and 18 months, and then 
annual boosters. The AVA and the AVP vaccines made by batch culture of pX01+/pX02- B. anthracis, comprise 
predominantly PA with trace quantities of various other bacterial derived components.  AVA contains traces of 
LF but is virtually free of EF, while AVP contains some LF and traces of EF.  However, due to the method of 
production, the relative concentration of these proteins in consecutive batches can vary [11].  
Very recently (23 Nov 2015), the US Food and Drug Administration approved a new indication for BioThrax 
(anthrax vaccine adsorbed) to prevent disease following suspected or confirmed exposure to B. anthracis 
(http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm474027.htm). The vaccine can be 
Anthrax | Monograph 16 






used together with antibiotic treatment, to prevent disease after exposure to anthrax spores. Protective 
antibody levels, which were determined in rabbit and monkey studies, were used to predict efficacy in humans.  
There is an ongoing effort to produce better defined vaccines for anthrax with contemporary formulations and 
presentations.  This is based on an evolving understanding of the complex pathogenesis of anthrax infection and 
the fact that it is insufficient to merely reduce the bacteraemia with antibiotics, since beyond a certain tipping 
point, the toxaemia is fatal.   To achieve a more defined vaccine, the recombinant expression of PA and/or LF has 
been pursued and a number of candidate rPA vaccines are currently in development and in clinical trials for 
safety.  These have the advantage of being defined, highly purified formulations which are enriched for PA.  
Additionally, formulations comprising spore coat proteins in combination with PA have been proposed.   
Non-clinical data from the use of these vaccines experimentally, would suggest that both AVA and AVP are 
efficacious in protecting animals, when given before and, within a defined time-frame, following exposure.  In 
clinical use however, the AVA and AVP formulations can be reactogenic and current efforts are aimed at 
rationalizing the clinical dosing regimen to reduce dosing frequency whilst enhancing immunogenicity.  
  
Russia 
A live anthrax vaccine (LAV) for human use was developed in the former Soviet Union (FSU) by Russian 
microbiologists in the 1940s when acapsular variants (pX01+/pX02-) of B. anthracis were selected from the fully 
virulent strain Krasnaya Niva [39].  Initially the vaccine consisted of dry spores of two non-encapsulated B. 
anthracis strains, namely STI-1 (from Sanitary and Technical Institute) and NO 3, capable of producing the 
anthrax toxin complex. Subsequently, the latter strain was removed from the formulation, leaving STI-1 as the 
only component.   According to multiple loci variable number tandem repeat analysis, STI-1 does not match any 
other genotypes including the vaccine strain Sterne, confirming its unique nature. Both cutaneous (scarification) 
and SC methods of vaccination are approved for human vaccination, and are associated with only mild reactions. 
Since the 1990s, a purified B. anthracis PA adsorbed on aluminium hydroxide was added to the vaccine, resulting 
in a combined anthrax vaccine formulation STI-1 +PA. Both vaccines demonstrated high efficacy against the 3 
main clinical forms of anthrax, and were able to induce a robust antitoxic humoral immune response, as well as 
cell-mediated immunity in different animal models (mice, rabbits, guinea pigs, baboons).  Moreover, vaccination 
with STI-1+PA accelerated immunity to anthrax, eliciting protection on days 7-10 after single injection of vaccine, 
while vaccination with STI-1 alone, required at least 2 sequential injections to achieve similar results.   LAV was 
widely used for vaccination of livestock during the period 1947-1960s and was associated with a significant 
reduction in both human and animal cases on anthrax in several areas of the FSU (currently the strain 55 is the 
one used as a vaccine strain for cattle). Concerns remain about the efficacy and/or reactogenicity of current 
anthrax vaccines. A recombinant B. anthracis strain carrying the plasmid pUB110PA-1 that provided stable 
expression of the PA, has been described and was capable of protecting guinea pigs against experimental 
anthrax after a single immunization.  
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Lanzhou Institute of Biological products produces a live spore suspension of strain A16R in 50% glycerol and 
distilled water. It is used as a single dose by scarification in 2 spots on the skin with a single booster after 6 or 12 
months, and annual boosters thereafter.  
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Table 9: Comparison of the different Anthrax livestock vaccines   
 
 
Sterne 34F2 Pasteur Carbosap
Status Most widely used anthrax vaccine in animals. Abandoned in most 
countries. Still used in 
China. 
Only used in Italy.  
Replaced by Sterne in 2006.
Type Rough variant, toxigenic, non-capsulated. Has lost 
the pX02 plasmid that codes for capsule production 
(pX01+/pX02-)
Toxigenic capsulated 
strain, with reduced 
virulence for most species 
(pX01-, pX02+).
Toxigenic capsulated 
strain, with reduced 
virulence for most species 
(pX01+, pX02+).
Origin Variant from a virulent bovine isolate in the 1930s, 
cultured on serum agar in elevated CO2 atmosphere 
by Max Sterne at Onderstepoort (South Africa)
Obtained by Pasteur by 
cultivating strains at 42C. 
Vaccine Institute of 
Asmara, during the II World 
War
Target species All livestock and wildlife Goats and horses. Cattle and sheep 
Other species Care should be taken with goats and llamas.  Horses 
slow at developing immunity.
There is a different 
formulation for cattle and 
sheep.
Indications Usually only one vaccination per year, preferably in 
spring. In high-risk zones, 2 doses are 
recommended (spring and autumn).
Zebras: 2 initial doses, 8 weeks apart.
Goats: 2 inoculations one month apart, being the 
first dose, 1/4 of the standard recommended dose.
Immunity Annual revaccination is usually recommended After one dose. Shorter 
than the other vaccines. 
Route Usually SC. IM has been used for wildlife. SC SC
Dose & volume OIE: Minimum 2-10 x106 culturable spores per dose 
for cattle, buffaloes and horses, and no less than 1-
5x106 culturable spores per dose for sheep, goats 
and pigs. 
Volumes are usually 2 ml for cattle and horses, 1 ml 
for small ruminants and for foals, calves and small 
animals 0.5 ml. 
Goats & horses: 0.125 ml
Cattle >6 months: 0.25 ml










42 days for meat (WHO recommendation), nil per 
milk. 
Pathogenicity Residual pathogenicity for goats and llamas Low
Efficacy Protection tends to be less than 100% if they have 
only received a single dose, and the dose was less 
than 107 spores. 
Zoonotic 
characteristics
Potentially infectious for humans. Self-injection by 
the operator can lead to infection, but few, if any, 
serious events have ever been recorded.
Use in pregnant 
animals





First used 1939 Italy: 1949
Large scale use Yes Used in the past, and in 
Italy until 2006. Now only 
in China, but not sure at 
which extent
It was used in Italy until 
2006.
Others Originally they were 2 
types: I and II. They were 
poorly standardised, some 
residual virulence or some 
inactive. 
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Table continued: Comparison of the different Anthrax vaccines   
 
 
Strain 55 1190R 
Status Used in Central and Eastern Europe Romania
Type Toxigenic, non-capsulating strain, analogous to 
Sterne
Stamatin strain, non-capsulated 
(pX01+/pX02-), similar to Sterne
Origin strain VNIIVViM 55 Developed by Nicolae Statmatin in 1937-
38, Pasteur Institute Bucharest (Romania)
Target species All farm animals Cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and horses
Other species
Indications Do not vaccinate animals younger than 3 months. Vaccinate in the spring, 14 days before 
moving grazing animals. 
Immunity Immunity develops after 10 days and last 12 months Immunity starts 21 days after vaccination, 
and lasts 12 months
Route SC or ID SC
Dose & volume Doses vary with different versions of the vaccine. 
One manuf: Sheep and goats: 0.5 ml in the middle 
third of the neck, in the hairless inner thigh or chest. 
Horses, cattle, deer, camels, donkeys, and fur-
bearing animals: 1 ml  in the middle third of the 
neck, pigs: 1 ml in the inner thigh or behind the ear. 
Antravac (Inst Pasteur Romania) has a 
concentration of 2.5 -5.5 x107 UFC/ml. 
The recommended dose is for cattle 0.5 
ml, for sheep 0.2 and goats 0.1 ml (in the 
tail crease), for pigs and horses 0.2 ml.  








Meat: 2 weeks, milk: nil. Both manufacturers found recommend 
zero days for meat and milk.
Pathogenicity




Potentially infectious for humans. Self-
inoculation requires urgent medical 
advice and supervision.
Use in pregnant 
animals
Do not use in the last month of pregnancy Mechanical abortions might occur if 
animals vaccinated during last month of 




Possible increase in body temperature, local 
reactions at the injection site. 
Light oedemas may occur at the side of 
injection, and sometimes an insignificant 
decrease in milk. Anaphylactic reactions 
2-3% animals
First used 1937
Large scale use Central and Eastern Europe Romania
Others Not a wide protective range against field isolates 
circulating in Russia and residual reactogenicity.
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Main vaccine needs: 
There is a need for a vaccine that: 
• Is not affected by antibiotic treatment, has a stronger initial immunity and can be used at the onset of 
an outbreak.  
• Can be given orally (especially for wildlife)  
• Safer for humans 
• Does not have withdrawal period 
• A longer duration of immunity would also be desirable (especially for wildlife).  
• vaccines   
 
Commercial vaccines manufactured in Africa and Asia  
 
The information summarised in Tables 10 and 11 below, is based on information from The Center for Food 
Security and Public health, Iowa State University (www.cfsph.iastate.edu/vaccines/index.php and Vetvac 
(www.vetvac.org).  More details have not been gathered, as another consultant has been commissioned to 
perform this task.  
Table 10:  Manufacturers of Anthrax vaccines in Africa and Asia.  
 





Botswana Vaccine Institute Botswana CABOVAX C® 
Strain: Sterne 
Live Botswana 
National Veterinary Research 
Institute 
Ethiopia Anthrax Spore Vaccine Live Ethiopia 
National Veterinary Research 
Institute 
Mozambique   Mozambique 
National Veterinary Research 
Institute – Vom 
Nigeria Anthrax Spore Vaccine (ASV)  
Sterne (34F2) 
Live Nigeria 
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South Africa Anthrax Spore Vaccine 
Sterne (34F2) 
Live South Africa 
MSD Animal Health (Merck) South Africa BLANTHRAX  
(Blackleg, Anthrax) 
Sterne 34F2 (A) 
Live South Africa 
 South Africa BOTUTHRAX  
(Botulism, Anthrax)  
Types C, D (B)  




 South Africa SUPAVAX  
(Anthrax, Botulism, Blackleg)  
Types C1+2, D (B)  




National Veterinary Research 
Institute 





Tanzania  Live Tanzania 
Central Veterinary Research 
Institute 
Zambia    
ASIA 
Tiankang Biopharmacuetical China No. II Anthrax Vaccine  China 
  No Capsule Anthrax Vaccine  China 
Indian Immunologicals 
Limited 
India Raksha Anthrax 
Strain: non-capsulated 
Live India 
Institute of Animal Health and 
Veterinary Biologicals 
India Anthrax Spore (IP) 
Strain: Weybridge 
Live India 
Institute of Veterinary 
Preventive Medicine 
India Anthrax Spore Vaccine 
Strain: Sterne (34F2) 
Live India 
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Jordan Bio-Industries Center 
(JOVAC) 
Jordan ANTHRAVAC 
Strain: Sterne (34F2) 




Japan Anthrax Vaccine 
Strain: N/A 
Live Japan 
Pt. Vaksindo Satwa Nusantara Indonesia VAKSIMUNE 
Sterne (34F2) 
 Indonesia, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, Vietnam and 
others 
Pusvetma Indonesia Anthravet  Indonesia 
Philippines Bureau of Animal 
Industry 
Philippines Anthrax Vaccine N/A Philippines 
CAVAC (ChoongAng Vaccine 
Laboratories Co., Ltd.) 
South Korea BoviShot® Anth-Leg  
(Anthrax, Blackleg Disease) 
Strain: N/A 
Live South Korea 
Green Cross Veterinary 
Products 
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Commercial vaccines imported into Africa and Asia 
 
The information in Table 11 is based on the questionnaires sent to the Directors of Veterinary Services office and 
regulators of the countries of interest.  Note that some vaccines might have been imported under DVS 
dispensation, and they are not necessary licensed in the country.  


























Bangladesh - - - - - - - 
India        
Indonesia        
Myanmar 
(Burma) 
- - - - - - - 
Nepal - - - - - - - 
Vietnam - - - - - - - 
AFRICA 







Ethiopia 200,000 400,000   
Ethiopia   Jordan     
Kenya - - - - - - - 
Madagascar        
Malawi N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Mali N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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JOVAC, the manufacturer from Jordan was also sent a questionnaire designed for key importers into the region.  
They confirmed that they export B. anthracis vaccine (Anthravac), strain Sterne 34F2 to Asia and Africa. They did 
not specify the countries or the volumes.  
According to CFSPH, Laboratorio Prondil from Uruguay, produces Anthrax vaccine alone and in combination, and 




Current use: Anthrax is a vaccine that is already used in combination vaccines by some laboratories.  It is usually 
combined with Blackleg disease (Clostridium chauvoei) and/or with Botulism (Clostridium botulinum types C and 
D). 
Desirable combinations: They might vary depending on the area, and the key diseases present. There is not an 
obvious “universal” combination that would be desired.   
Mozambique        
Rwanda Bivax  Coopers/Kenya 360,000 220,000 160,000 120,000 
Senegal        
South Africa        
Tanzania * Bacillus 
Anthrax 
34F2 Spore South Africa 4 - - - 
Uganda - - - - - - - 
Zambia 
 
- 34F2 South Africa 2,000 2,000 28,700 - 
- 34F2 Uruguay 97,800 40,000   
 
-   Questionnaire received, no information provided (blank).  
* Information supplied by the local Regulatory Authorities 
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The Target Product Profiles (TPPs) reflect the availability and utility of current agents and incorporate features 
that will be necessary to improve on the current products and to address unmet needs, taking into account the 
particular requirements of the poorest livestock keepers.   
The TPPs are more robust when they include the opinions and consider the needs of the different stakeholders.  
While efforts have been made to encompass them, the TPP showed in Table 12 below, should be considered a 
proposal, a live document subject to improvements.  
Information on current vaccines has been obtained from the datasheet of different products of the most 
common vaccine used globally, the Sterne 34F2. The ones reviewed are:  
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Table 12:  Manufacturers of Anthrax vaccines in Africa and Asia.  
 
 Attribute Minimum (current available vaccine) Ideal 
1 Antigen 
 
Immunogen with protective antigens 
for Bacillus anthracis  
Immunogen with protective antigens for 
Bacillus anthracis 
2 Indication for use For active immunization of cattle, 
sheep, goats, pigs, horses, mules, 
donkeys and camels. 
Revaccinate annually approx. 4 weeks 
prior to the time the disease usually 
appears.  
For active immunization of cattle, water 
buffalo, sheep, goats, pigs, horses, 
mules, donkeys, camels and wildlife.  
3 Recommended species 
 
Cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, horses, 
mules, donkeys and camels.  
Cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats and pigs. 
Also all susceptible animals, including 
susceptible wildlife. 
4 Recommended dose 
 
0.5 - 1 -2 ml SC 
(some manufacturers have different 
recommendations and doses for 
different species) 
Same dose for all species (1 or 2 ml) 
5 Pharmaceutical form 
 
Injectable suspension Ready to use solution/suspension 
6 Route of administration 
 
SC or IM (some manufacturers 
mention ID) 
Goats must be injected in the inner 
thigh or tailfold as these animals are 
inclined to show allergic reactions with 
swellings at the site of injection, which 
may cause suffocation if the 
inoculation is given in the neck.  
SC, Intramuscular or oral (bait vaccine, 
this last route, very important for 
wildlife) 
7 Regimen - primary 
vaccination 
Two vaccines, 2-3 weeks apart in 
heavy contaminated areas. 
Single lifetime dose 
8 Regimen - booster Revaccinate annually.  Lifelong immunity after primary 
vaccination 
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9 Epidemiological relevance Protection against B. anthracis   Protection against B. anthracis and all 
possible mutants 
10 Recommended age at first 
vaccination 
From 3 months of age From 1-2 months of age, when other 
vaccines are applied.  
11 Onset of immunity 
 
7-10 days <7 days (very important for outbreaks) 





13 Expected efficacy To prevent disease & prevent 
mortality. 
To prevent infection and transmission in 
100% of the animals. No disease & no 
mortality in vaccinated animals after 
virulent challenge. 
14 Expected safety Possible swelling at the site of 
injection, which subsides after a few 
days.  
Adverse reactions have been reported 
in young and miniature horses. 
Anaphylactoid reaction may occur.  
No post-vaccinal reactions at any age. 
Safe for pregnant animals at any stage.  
Safe for all sexes at any age.  
15 Withdrawal period 
 
Meat: 0 - 14 - 42 days (depending on 
manufacturer) – WHO recommends 42 
days.  
Nil for milk and meat 
16 Special requirements for 
animals 
Do not vaccinate un-healthy animals. 
All working animals should be rested 
for 7-10 days after vaccination.  
Avoid antibiotic therapy 7 days before 
and 14 days after vaccination.  
Vaccinate all animals 
17 Special requirements for 
persons 
  None 
18 Package size 
 
10 -100 doses Multiple pack size from 5 doses 
19 Price to end user 
  
Anthrax | Monograph 16 









20 Storage condition and 
shelf-life as packaged for 
sale 
Stable at 4-8°C for 24 months 
 
Stable at 30°C for 24 months 
 
21 In-use stability 
 
  24 hours or greater 
22 Other:  Interference with 
antibiotics 
Antibiotic treatment will interfere with 
vaccine efficacy.  
Antibiotic treatment will not interfere 
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Scientific quality: The publications and data from the different research groups, should be carefully evaluated.  
The use of good science and good experimental design with use of proper controls, adequate numbers, suitable 
challenge model, reproduction of results by them and by independent groups, and appropriate analysis has not 
been verified for this monograph.  If any of these projects were to be pursued, a detailed peer review taking into 
account the above considerations is strongly recommended.   
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ANNEX 1:  Additional data on disease presence 
and incidence 
 
Reports to OIE on Anthrax: 
 
When different animal health statuses between domestic and wild animal population are provided, the box is 
split in two: the upper part for domestic animals, and the lower part for wild animals.  
Anthrax in Asia: Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal and Vietnam 
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Anthrax in Western Africa: Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal 
 
Anthrax in Eastern Africa:  Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda 
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ANNEX 2:  Additional research results from Mr Ndumnego (Dr Beyer group) 
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Comparing immunogenicity of non-living anthrax vaccine candidates in combination with simultaneous 
antibiotic treatment in goats  
 
OC Ndumnego1, S Koehler2, J Crafford1, W Beyer2, H van Heerden1 
1Department of Veterinary Tropical Diseases, Faculty of Veterinary Science, University of Pretoria, 
Onderstepoort, South Africa;  
2 Institute for Animal Sciences, Dept. of Environmental and Animal Hygiene, University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart, 
Germany.  
 
Potential advantages of non-living anthrax vaccines include the simultaneous use of antibiotics and vaccination 
for the treatment of valuable livestock and endangered wildlife during anthrax outbreaks. In this study we 
assessed the immunogenicity of these vaccine antigens, either in combination with or without antibiotics, in 
goats compared to the live spore Sterne vaccine. 
The vaccine antigens comprised of recombinant protective antigen (rPA), spore-specific bacillus collagen-like 
antigen (rBclA) and formaldehyde inactivated spores (FIS). Groups of age-matched goats (n = 5) were vaccinated 
3 times at three weeks interval. Two control groups were vaccinated twice with the Sterne live spore vaccine 
with or without Penicillin G (Pen G). Serum and peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMC) were isolated before 
every vaccination and specific antibody responses to homologous antigens measured using ELISA, toxin 
neutralisation assay (TNA) and the lymphocyte proliferation assay.  
Results showed goats receiving the full antigen complement (rPA + rBclA + FIS) had the highest antibody and 
TNA titres. Simultaneous administration of these antigens with Pen G had no diminishing effect on the immune 
response. Furthermore, comparing the immunogenicity between these groups (Pen G treated or untreated) and 
the twice-Sterne vaccinated goats revealed equivalent development of titres, after the second vaccination. The 
control group vaccinated with Sterne vaccine and simultaneously treated with Pen G showed no antibody titres 
at any time-point. In conclusion, the current data indicate promising potential for further development of non-
living anthrax vaccines in ruminants which can be used as an alternative to the Sterne spore live vaccine under 
circumstances which call for antibiotic treatment and vaccination.  
 
 
